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Introduction
During the recent debates over the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA), the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), and the extension of fast-track rules to both the
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, many charged that international trade
agreements clash with democratic principles. This charge rings true.
The international trade system operates contrary to every principle of
democracy and government accountability imbedded in U.S. domestic
policymaking. Secrecy pervades the entire system. Trade officials operate
behind closed doors with no public record of their activities when they
negotiate or implement trade agreements or when they resolve disputes
arising under them. As a result, there are no mechanisms for the public to
monitor the development or implementation of international trade policy.
To compound matters, trade decision-makers owe their allegiances to the
trade regime and make no attempt to invite or incorporate other views.
There are no avenues for public participation to ensure that other per-
spectives are taken into account. Thus, in the coming era of "government
by trade agreements," domestic prerogatives will be foreclosed or made
more costly by trade bureaucrats secretly negotiating agreements and
adjudicating disputes thousands of miles away.
As trade agreements extend into a vast array of domestic environmen-
tal and health initiatives, the development and implementation of those
agreements must be democratized to incorporate the openness, public
participation, and accountability that are fundamental to our system of
government. When confronted with this demand, U.S. trade negotiators
complain that they are only one participant in the international system
and cannot reform it alone.
The same rationale cannot excuse the anti-democratic processes for
developing domestic trade policies. The U.S. agencies that establish trade
policy model their operations after the foreign policy and national security
agencies. That model is poorly suited to many of the environmental,
health, and other non-trade issues being addressed in trade policies. It is
time for the United States to democratize its own development and imple-
mentation of trade policies. Reforming the U.S. trade policy-making pro-
cess will improve the viability, responsiveness, and integrity of U.S. trade
policies. Further, the U.S. action will serve as a model for reforming the
international trade system.
Part I of this article describes how trade policies are shaping a vast
array of domestic health, safety, environmental, and other policies that are
established through open, participatory, and accountable processes. Part
II discusses how the international trade system deviates from the demo-
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cratic principles used to develop domestic policies. Part III contains an
analogous assessment of U.S. trade policy-making. Part IV presents a
series of reforms designed to democratize U.S. negotiation and approval
of trade agreements (subpart A), U.S. implementation of trade agree-
ments (subpart B), and U.S. participation in dispute settlement proceed-
ings under trade agreements (subpart C).
I. Trade Agreements Are Shaping Health, Safety, Environmental, and
Other Domestic Policies
International trade agreements are no longer limited to trade matters
such as tariff schedules, import quotas, border taxes, and anti-dumping
rules. Instead, today's trade agreements are restricting governmental
actions in non-trade areas that only peripherally affect trade.
Recent trade agreements reach out to cover new areas of domestic
regulation that had previously been outside the purview of trade agree-
ments. For example, NAFTA establishes elaborate rules limiting the
extent to which food safety measures, bank and insurance regulation, and
energy conservation programs may restrict trade. The Uruguay Round of
GATT imposes an even more restrictive set of limitations on food safety
measures. Both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round tighten many
existing trade rules, such as those controlling product standards, govern-
ment subsidies, and procurement, in ways that may significantly limit the
extent to which governments may promote environmental, health, and
safety goals.
In addition, international standard-setting activities are being con-
ducted under trade agreements, and the standards established by interna-
tional bodies are being given preferred trade status. For example, both
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements on the Application of Sani-
tary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT) require countries to use relevant international standards as the
basis for domestic standards, unless certain conditions are met.1 Both
agreements also establish committees to develop uniform standards and to
promote international harmonization of domestic food safety and techni-
cal standards.2
These and other provisions of trade agreements are key to the viabil-
ity of existing and future domestic initiatives. This is because approved
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 1.L.M. 605, arts. 713(1), (2), 905(1) [hereinafter NAFrA]; Agreement
on the Application of Sanitaty and Phytosanitay Measures, GATT Doc. MTN/FA 1I-AIA-4
[hereinafter SPS Agreement], in Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations [hereinafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec.
15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994), reprinted in OFncE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATVE,
FINAL Acr EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION AS OF DEC. 15, 1993) (1993); Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-A1A-6 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter TBT Agreement], in
Uruguay Round, supra.
2. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 722, 913; SPS Agreement supra note 1, paras. 38-44;
TBT Agreemen supra note 1, art. 13.
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trade agreements are binding international legal obligations that require
the parties to change their laws to comply with the terms of the agree-
ments. It is for this reason that legislation approving a trade agreement
typically includes an array of modifications to bring existing federal stat-
utes into conformity with the agreement. Indeed, under the current U.S.
statutory scheme, "if changes in existing laws or new statutory authority is
[sic] required to implement such trade agreement or agreements, provi-
sions, necessary or appropriate to implement such trade agreement or
agreements, either repealing or amending existing laws or providing new
statutory authority" must be included in the legislation approving the
trade agreement.3
For example, the NAFTA Implementation Act amended several
animal and food inspection statutes to give agencies the discretion to per-
mit imports from Canada and Mexico that do not meet U.S. standards that
had previously been absolute barriers to imports. One such amendment
allows the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) to issue regulations
excepting imports of animals, specifically live Mexican and Canadian cat-
tle, sheep, and swine from a federal statute that prohibits imports of dis-
eased or infected animals or animals exposed to infection within sixty days
prior to export.4 Another amendment provides that poultry imports from
Mexico and Canada need not comply with U.S. standards if the imports
are "subject to inspection, sanitary, quality, species verification and residue
standards that are equivalent to United States standards" and "have been
processed in facilities and under conditions that meet standards that are
equivalent to United States standards."5 Still another amendment permits
meat imports from Mexican and Canadian plants if USDA certifies that
the foreign plants either comply with U.S. standards or with equivalent
requirements regarding inspection, building construction, and other stat-
utory and regulatory requirements. 6 Previously, USDA could issue such a
certification only if it determined that the foreign plants "complied with
requirements that are at least equal to all inspection and building construc-
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(b)(1)(C) (1988).
4. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
182, § 361(b), 107 Stat. 2057, 2122 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3421 (Supp. V
1993)) [hereinafter NAFTA Implementation Act] (excepting Canadian and Mexican
imports from 21 U.S.C. § 104 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); see also id. § 361(c) (permitting
USDA to issue regulations waiving any requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 105 (1988 & Supp. V
1993), which requires official inspections of animals to ascertain whether they have
been infected or exposed to contagious diseases, with respect to shipments from Mex-
ico or Canada).
5. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 361(f) (exemption from 21 U.S.C. § 466(d)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)). This standard has been construed by the Fifth Circuit to
require identical facilities and conditions to similar ones in the United States. Accord-
ingly, the court struck down a USDA regulation allowing imports that meet require-
ments "at least equal to those applicable to the Federal System in the United States."
Mississippi Poultry Ass'n v. Madigan, 992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting 52 Fed.
Reg. 15963 (1987)), amended, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993), rehkgranted, 9 F.3d 1116 (5th
Cir. 1993).
6. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 361(f).
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tion standards and all other provisions" of the statute and regulations. 7
These amendments substitute agency discretion for absolute bans on cer-
tain imports and mandatory compliance with statutorily prescribed inspec-
tion procedures.8
The NAFTA Implementation Act also amended the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act to change the way that Corporate Aver-
age Fuel Economy (CAFE) will be calculated for automobiles produced in
Mexico.9 Because the NAFTA Implementation Act mandated the
changes, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) subsequently
amended its CAFE regulations to embody the new calculation methods
without complying with notice and comment procedures applicable to
agency rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act.' 0 In its final
rule, EPA explained that it had dispensed with prior notice and public
comment procedures because "the rule issued today merely conforms pre-
existing regulations as required by the NAFTA Implementation Act and
does not involve an exercise of discretion by the Administrator" and
because "it is impracticable to have notice-and-comment rule-making com-
pleted in [the] less than one month between the date of enactment and
the date by which the regulations must be effective."" This example of
EPA's truncated rule-making process illustrates the effect that a trade
agreement can have on regulatory proceedings. When a trade agreement
mandates a particular action and the domestic rule-making agency no
longer has discretion to consider alternatives, the public's ability to influ-
ence the agency's action is lost.
Aside from amending specific federal statutes and compelling regula-
tory changes, the federal law implementing a trade agreement normally
contains a provision prescribing its effect on state law. As a matter of inter-
national law, and under the terms of most trade agreements, the federal
government is held responsible for state laws that violate a trade agree-
ment. The federal government has a legal obligation to ensure that states
comply with the agreement. Accordingly, federal statutes implementing
trade agreements typically make it clear that the trade agreement prevails
over inconsistent state laws. Thus, the legislation implementing the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement explicitly states that "[t] he provisions of
the Agreement prevail over (A) any conflicting State law; and (B) any con-
flicting application of any State law to any person or circumstance; to the
7. 21 U.S.C. § 620(e)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. The same amendments have been included in the Uruguay Round implement-
ing legislation which would change the statutory mandates for all countries, not simply
Mexico and Canada. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 43(h)-(l),
1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4809, 4969-70.
9. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 371; 15 U.S.C. § 2003(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
10. EPA Final Rule: Revisions to CAFE Calculations Pursuant to the NAFTA Imple-
mentation Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 677 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 600) [hereinaf-
ter EPA Final Rule]; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
11. EPA Final Rule, supra note 10, at 678.
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extent of the conflict."12 The legislation implementing the trade agree-
ment may also provide a specific mechanism for the federal government
to bring conflicting state laws into compliance with the agreement. For
example, the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement law authorizes the
United States to "bring an action challenging any provision of State law, or
the application thereof to any person or circumstance, on the ground that
the provision or application is inconsistent with the Agreement."13 Simi-
larly, the NAFTA Implementation Act retains this authority for the federal
government, as would the Uruguay Round implementing legislation. 14
Even when the trade agreement does not compel an immediate
change in domestic law, it often shapes and limits the discretion of domes-
tic lawmakers in carrying out their lawmaking, regulatory, and enforce-
ment functions. An illustration of the complete removal of agency
discretion is EPA's rule-making to refine the CAFE calculations to comply
with NAFTA.
In other situations, the effect is more subtle. For example, the Pelly
Amendment grants the President the discretion to impose trade sanctions
on countries that have been found by the Secretary of Commerce to
diminish the effectiveness of international fishery conservation agree-
ments.' 5 In a recent trade challenge, a GATT panel suggested that any
exercise of that discretion would violate GAYl'.16 Thus, the President may
choose to exercise self-restraint to avoid a GAT confrontation. 17 Under a
companion statutory provision intended to give the President less discre-
tion than the Pelly Amendment, the President has an obligation to impose
economic sanctions against countries identified by the Secretary of Com-
merce as diminishing the effectiveness of the International Conference for
the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).' 8 To avoid triggering this statutory
obligation, the Secretary of Commerce refused to certify Japanese whaling
activities as diminishing the effectiveness of a five-year ICRW moratorium.
12. Can.-U.S.: Free Trade Agreement, § 102(b) (1)), 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988).
13. Id § 102(b)(3).
14. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 102(b) (2); Statement of Administrative Action,
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, at 12 (1993), reprinted in
H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 45Q, 461 (1993); Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, § 102(b), (c). The Uruguay Round implementing legislation would also give the
U.S. Trade Representative the power to direct other agencies to change certain deter-
minations that have been found by a GATT dispute settlement body to conflict with
GATT. Id. § 129(a), (b)(2)-(4).
15. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GENERAL AG .rrmE" ON TARrS
AND TRADE (GATT), BAsic INsTRUMENTs AND SELEcrE DocuMENTS [hereinafter
B.I.S.D.], 39th Supp. 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1954 (1991) [hereinafter Tuna-
Dolphin 1].
17. The Pelly amendment allows the President to bar imports only if the prohibi-
tion is consistent with GAIT. 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Several
other statutes similarly make their mandates inapplicable if they are inconsistent with
GATT. Forest Resources Conservation and Shortage Relief Act, 16 U.S.C. § 620c (1988
& Supp. V 1993); Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 608(e) (1) (1988); 15 U.S.C.
§ 4053(d) (1988).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2) (1988).
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The Secretary pointed to an agreement negotiated between Japan and the
United States that permitted Japanese whaling at a reduced level for sev-
eral years and that provided for the cessation of Japanese commercial
whaling at the end of a five-year moratorium. In a challenge to the Presi-
dent's refusal to impose sanctions againstJapan, the Supreme Court held
that the statute gave the Secretary of Commerce sufficient latitude to
refuse to certify Japanese whaling activities despite its mandatory
language.19
Similarly, trade concerns have shaped EPA's approach to pesticide
regulation. In 1983, EPA banned the use of ethylene dibromide (EDB) on
domestic produce based on evidence linking EDB to cancer and reproduc-
tive risks. For imported fruit, most notably mangoes, EPA regulations per-
mitted EDB residues until September 1, 1985. However, as that deadline
approached, the State Department pressured EPA to extend it because the
EDB ban threatened to damage the economies of mango-producing coun-
tries. EPA relented and extended the deadline. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that EPA had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by relying exclusively on the potential harm to foreign econo-
mies in making its decision.2 0 On remand, EPA again extended the dead-
line, concluding that mangoes with EDB residues would cause less harm
than would occur if mango-producing countries chose not to cooperate in
ensuring the safety of foods exported to the United States. The D.C. Cir-
cuit upheld this determination. 2 ' Thus, EPA incorporated trade concerns
into its pesticide residue decision under a statute that appears to make
public health concerns paramount.22
A subsequent pesticide decision illustrates another way that trade con-
cerns shape agency actions. In 1990, the FDA discovered residues of the
pesticide procymidone in imported wine. The pesticide was not used in
the United States and thus had no U.S. tolerances. The manufacturer
petitioned EPA to establish a tolerance on an expedited basis.23 Scientific
studies suggested that procymidone is a carcinogen and a reproductive
toxin, but the data were inadequate to permit the full analysis required
under domestic law. Nevertheless, EPA established an interim tolerance
based on the available data.2 4 Thus, trade disruptions precipitated an EPA
19. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 241 (1986).
20. National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 809 F.2d 875,
883 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
21. National Coalition Against the Misuse of Pesticides v. Thomas, 815 F.2d 1579,
1582 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
23. Procyrnidone Residues in Wine, 55 Fed. Reg. 39171-7 (1990) (to be codified at
40 C.FR. pt. 186 (proposed Sept. 25, 1990)).
24. Pesticide Tolerance for Procyrnidone, 56 Fed. Reg. 19,518 (1991) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180). EPA recently proposed a permanent tolerance for pro-
cymidone that is identical to the tolerance established by the Codex Alimentarius
Commission, a U.N. standard-setting body, whose standards are given preferential status
under both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATT. Proposed Pesticide Toler-
ance for Procyrnidone, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,144 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 180).
However, it is not at all clear that the proposed tolerance comports with the statutory
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decision permitting the use of this pesticide based on inadequate data and
an incomplete analysis of its public health effects.
In both the EDB and procymidone situations, a foreign affairs agency
played a significant role in shaping EPA's domestic health regulatory deci-
sions. The State Department exerted strong pressure on EPA to weaken
public health protections in both instances to promote international
trade.25
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) may have played a similar role
in connection with the phaseout of methyl bromide. This compound is a
soil sterilant that is a powerful ozone-depleter, is highly toxic to workers,
and is a suspected human carcinogen. In early 1993, in response to a peti-
tion from three environmental organizations, EPA proposed to list methyl
bromide as an ozone-depleter under the Clean Air Act and to phase out its
production and consumption by the year 2000. In an attempt to gain sup-
port for NAFTA from several Florida Representatives, Michael Kantor, the
USTR, delivered a letter to the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association on
November 9, 1993 (one week before the NAFTA vote), which promised
that EPA would not restrict the use or manufacture of methyl bromide
until the year 2000 and that USDA would support full funding for research
into alternatives. 26 The letter also stated:
The President wants to assure you that if no satisfactory alternative is found,
the Administration will consider appropriate action to guarantee that our
agricultural producers are not left without a commercially viable means of
achieving the necessary soil and post-harvest fumigation. Given the critical
nature of this substance to our trade interests, you can be certain of my
personal involvement in this matter to ensure that your commercial inter-
ests are not affected by any future restrictions.27
The Florida fruit and vegetable producers understood this letter to
promise that EPA would not finalize the proposed methyl bromide
phaseout. Thus several Florida Representatives reportedly decided to sup-
port NAFITA after the Administration satisfied the Florida producers'
demands.28 When the deal became public, EPA sought to assure the envi-
ronmental organizations that supported NAFTA that EPA would not
standard of public health protection because EPA did not conduct its health assessment
at the level of the proposed tolerance.
25. National Coalition, 809 F.2d 875; Tina E. Levine, Assessment and Communications
of Risks from Pesticide Residues in Food, 47 FoOD & DRUG L.J. 207, 211 (1992) (Special
assistant to the director of EPA's Office of Pesticide Programs disclosed that
"[t]hroughout the Agency's deliberations, there was considerable pressure [from the
State Department] to act more quickly so that the busy Christmas season would not be
lost.")
26. Letter from Michael Kantor, Ambassador, USTR, to MichaelJ. Stuart, Executive
Vice President and General Manager, Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association (received
Nov. 10, 1993), repinted in Administration Drops NAF1A Promise to Undo Limits on Fungi-
cide INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 1993, at S-3 [hereinafter Kantor letter].
27. Id. at S-4.
28. See Kantor letter, supra note 26, at S-3; Douglas Jehl, The Free Trade Accord:- The
Overview; Scramble in the Capitol for Today's Trade Pact Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at
Al.
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weaken the phaseout. 29 On November 30, 1993, EPA issued its final rule
phasing out methyl bromide use and production by the year 2001, one
year longer than under the proposed rule. Regardless of whether the
extension was connected to the NAFTA deal with the Florida growers, and
EPA contends that it was not,30 this incident raises the specter of a foreign
affairs agency intervening in an environmental regulatory matter exclu-
sively within the statutory jurisdiction of EPA.
The effect of a trade agreement is not limited to the amendments to
domestic law contained in the implementing legislation or to the volun-
tary actions undertaken by federal agencies. Rather, trade agreements
establish principles that existing and future laws, regulations, and enforce-
ment activities must satisfy.
To ensure that countries abide by their legal obligations, trade agree-
ments provide a mechanism for countries to bring trade challenges
against other countries that are alleged to be in violation of the trade
agreement. In recent years, trade challenges have been mounted to
domestic health and environmental measures that had previously been
thought to be the province of domestic law. Examples include measures
designed to reduce tobacco use, to promote automobile fuel efficiency, to
ensure that milk is produced in accordance with sanitation and health
standards, and to institute effective recycling programs.3 1
One of the most prominent dispute settlement decisions came in
1991 when a dispute panel accepted Mexico's claim that the U.S. Marine
Mammal Protection Act3 2 impermissibly restricts tuna imports. That Act
prohibits tuna imports from countries whose fishing methods result in
excessive incidental killing or maiming of dolphins. The panel concluded
that these restrictions on tuna imports violate GATT's prohibition on
import bans and do not fall within any exceptions to that prohibition
because: (1) they bar tuna imports based not on a product characteristic,
but based solely on the process by which the tuna is caught; (2) they seek to
protect a species outside U.S. territorial jurisdiction; and (3) the United
States did not show that less trade-restrictive measures, including coopera-
29. Id.; David Lauter, Pesticide FRap Threatened Crucial Dea4 NAFTA: Kantor's 'Mislead-
ing' Letter to Gro~vers Put Accord with Tlorida Delegation in Jeopardy. The Issue Riled Environ-
mentalists, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at A17.
30. Protection of Stratospheric Ozone, 58 Fed. Reg. 65,018, (1993) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt.82); Methyl Bromide Protection Allowed for One Extra Year in EPA Phaseout
Rue Reg., Econ. & L. (BNA) No. 229, at A-31 (Dec. 1, 1993).
31. Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, B.I.S.D.,
36th Supp. 392 (1990) [hereinafter Thailand Panel Report]; United States-In the Matter of
Puerto Rico Regulations on the Import, Distribution and Sale of UHT Milk from Quebe, U.S.-
Can. Free Trade Agreement Dispute Panel Report, Doc. USA-93-1807-01 (June 3, 1993)
[hereinafter Puerto Rico Regulations Report] (on file with the Cornell International LawJour-
na); Establishment of Dispute Settlement Panel concerning Certain U.S. Automobile
Taxes, 58 Fed. Reg. 31,788 (1988) (panel report issued Sept. 19, 1994); Case 302/86,
Re Disposable Beer Cans: E.C. Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607, 1 C.M.L.R.
619 (1989).
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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tive international arrangements, were unavailable.3 3 Recently, a second
GATT panel found that the U.S. embargo on tuna imports from interme-
diary countries that continue to import tuna from countries that violate
the statutory dolphin protections violate GATT. This panel's rationale,
however, differs somewhat from the first tuna-dolphin decision.
3 4
If a trade panel finds that a measure violates a trade agreement or
otherwise impairs an expected benefit from the agreement, it typically
directs the losing country to remove the offending measure even if that
requires a change in domestic law. These enforcement mechanisms are
being greatly enhanced in the most recent trade agreements, which con-
tain automatic authorization for the winning country to impose trade sanc-
tions if the losing country does not comply with the panel ruling within a
specified (relatively short) period of time.3 5 The NAFTA and Uruguay
Round also eliminate a country's ability to block adoption of a dispute
panel decision, which has binding force only once it is adopted unani-
mously by the parties to the agreement.3 6 The United States has thus far
blocked adoption of the tuna-dolphin reports by the GATT contracting
parties by holding out on the consensus needed for their adoption. The
Uruguay Round dispute settlement rules make adoption of panel reports
automatic unless all member countries decide, by consensus, to block
their adoption. 37
The United States has historically taken its GATT obligations seri-
ously. For example, when the Agricultural Adjustment Act was amended
to permit certain import quotas on agricultural goods, the Executive
Branch obtained a GATT waiver to avoid a possible breach. 38 Similarly,
when the United States has been found in violation of GAIT, it has often
changed the offending law. Thus, in the wake of the tuna-dolphin panel
decision, the United States adopted the International Dolphin Conserva-
tion Act, although that Act has not yet led to a satisfactory resolution of
the dispute.3 9
33. Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 16, paras. 5.10, 5.24.
34. United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, GATr Doc. D529/R (May 20, 1994),
33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin fl].
35. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II-A2, §§ 16, 17 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement], in Uru-
guay Round, supra note 1; NAFMA, supra note 1, art. 2019.
36. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2017-19; Dispute Settlemen supra note 35.
37. Dispute Settlement supra note 35, §§ 17.6, 17.14; see id., §§ 16, 17, 21, 22. A losing
party may appeal the legal basis for the panel ruling to another internal GATT tribunal.
Although an appeal stays the panel ruling, appeal decisions are also automatically
adopted within 30 days of their issuance and sanctions are automatically authorized
unless all the GAiT parties unanimously reject the appeal ruling. Id.
38. Decision of the Contracting Parties of GATT, GAIT, B.I.S.D., supra note 16, 3d Supp.
141 (1955); John H. Jackson, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States
Domestic Law, 66 MicH. L. REv. 249, 267-68 (1967).
39. International Dolphin Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425
(1992) (lifting the embargo against countries that formally commit to a five-year mora-
torium on the use of purse seine nets to encircle dolphins during tuna fishing and
requiring impartial observers on tuna harvesting vessels).
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The United States has often gone to great lengths to avert a trade
challenge. On December 15, 1993, more than two years after the statutory
deadline, EPA issued final regulations implementing the reformulated
gasoline mandates of the Glean Air Act Amendments of 1990.40 The
Clean Air Act Amendments require EPA to establish requirements for
reformulated gasoline to be used in specified nonattainment areas which
require the greatest reduction in emissions of ozone forming volatile
organic compounds (during the high ozone season) and emissions of toxic
air pollutants (during the entire year) achievable through the reformula-
tion of conventional gasoline, taking into consideration the cost of achiev-
ing such emission reductions, any nonair-quality and other air-quality
related health and environmental impacts and energy requirements. 4 1
Certain emissions are to be less than or at least no greater than their level
in a baseline year.42
In the final rule, EPA permitted domestic refiners to use several meth-
ods of calculating their baselines. Importers, however, were permitted to
use only one method, a method which most importers lack adequate docu-
mentation to utilize.43 Foreign refiners could also use a statutory baseline,
but domestic refiners could use the statutory baseline only if EPA lacked
confidence in their data to support the other calculation methods. The
Venezuelan national oil company commented on the proposed rule and
argued that importers should be subject to the same baseline provisions as
domestic companies. EPA, however, was concerned that foreign compa-
nies did not have adequate documentation of the quality of their gasoline
sold in the United States in the baseline year and that EPA would be
unable to verify such data or enforce a scheme that would permit individ-
ual foreign refinery baseline calculations.
After issuance of the final rule, Venezuela sought consultations under
the GATT and was prepared to seek establishment of a dispute settlement
panel to hear the case. To avoid a showdown and a possible adverse GATT
ruling during the congressional debate over whether to approve the Uru-
guay Round, the USTR and the State Department brokered a resolution of
the dispute. In the resolution, EPA agreed to propose an amendment to
its rule which would allow Venezuela more flexibility in establishing its
own baseline for imports up to the amount of its 1990 imports. EPA also
agreed to issue its proposed rule prior to the deadline for placing items
40. Regulations of Fuels, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
80).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Gasoline sold in metropolitan
areas with the most severe air pollution must be reformulated to reduce vehicle emis-
sions of toxic and ozone-forming compounds. Other areas may opt into the program.
In order to prevent the dumping of dirty gasoline, the amendments prohibit conven-
tional gasoline sold in the rest of the country from becoming more polluting than it was
in 1990. Compliance with the reformulated gasoline requirements is measured from
1990 baseline emissions. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (k) (2) (A) (1988).
43. Regulation of Fuels, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
80) (proposed May 3, 1994).
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(including requests for the establishment of dispute panels) on the
agenda for the next GATT meeting, which it did.44 Although EPA is
adhering to notice and comment rule-making procedures, a State Depart-
ment cable suggests that the United States committed itself to adopt the
proposal in order to resolve the trade dispute.45 Ultimately, EPA
refrained from finalizing the proposed rule only because Congress passed
a budget rider preventing it from doing so. 46 Many have charged that the
proposed modifications would significantly worsen air pollution in the
Northeast, possibly in violation of EPA's statutory mandates in the Clean
Air Act Amendments. 47
In sum, there can be little doubt that the trade system is expanding its
influence over a wide range of domestic policy-making activities. Indeed,
the Uruguay Round would, if approved, establish a World Trade Organiza-
tion, a new international organization with a pervasive infrastructure and
self-perpetuating powers to implement, enforce, and expand the multilat-
eral trade rules.48 Although the negotiation, implementation, and resolu-
tion of disputes under international trade agreements has significant
implications for domestic policy-making, the trade rules are neither devel-
oped nor implemented in accordance with the core democratic principles
that govern the domestic policies being affected by the trade agreements.
II. International Trade Policies Are Not Formulated in Accordance
with the Democratic Principles Applicable to Domestic
Environmental, Health, and Safety Policies
The current trade system deviates from the core democratic principles
that enable domestic governmental bodies to forge solutions to controver-
sial environmental, health, and safety problems. Many trade officials con-
sider trade issues matters to be negotiated between sovereign nations,
rather than policies to be developed in accordance with democratic proce-
dures. Such negotiations, whether to develop the terms of a trade agree-
ment, to implement it, or to resolve disputes under it, adhere to the model
of the most sensitive international negotiations.
International trade negotiations are carried out in secret without any
mechanisms for informing the public about the matters being negotiated,
44. EPA, Note to Correspondents: EPA Statement on GATr Settlement with Vene-
zuelan Government (March 23, 1994) (on file with the ConellInternationalLawJourna);
59 Fed. Reg. 22,800 (1994).
45. Cable from U.S. State Department to U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela (Mar.
14, 1994) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
46. See Veterans Administration, Housing and Urban Development and Independ-
ent Agencies Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1995, H.R. 4624, S. Amendment 87,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
47. Letter from James K. Hambright, Mid-Atlantic Regional Air Management Asso-
ciation to Carol Browner, Administrator, EPA (Nov. 15, 1993) (on file with the Cornell
International Law Journal), Letter from 14 U.S. Senators to Michael Kantor, USTR (Mar.
18, 1994) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
48. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), GATr Doc. MTN/FA
II (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter WTO Agreement], in Uruguay Round, supra note 1.
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for obtaining public input, or for ensuring that the decision-makers are
neutral and have a complete record on which to make decisions. The
negotiators are trade officials who rarely have expertise or experience in
other social policies that are affected by the end product of the negotia-
tions. Although the negotiators claim that negotiations and foreign rela-
tions would be impaired if the public were made privy to information
about proposals on the table, draft agreements are routinely made avail-
able to hundreds of industry advisors49 and are sometimes leaked when it
suits the purposes of the negotiators.50 Aside from sporadic leaks, the
public is kept in the dark until the terms of the agreement have been cast
in stone.
The secrecy and trade bias of the decision-makers extend to imple-
mentation of, and dispute resolution under, the trade agreement after it is
concluded. International standard-setting bodies generally have a man-
date to promote international trade that eclipses their public health man-
date. For example, both the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round SPS
Agreement designate the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) as the
international body establishing presumptively trade-legitimate food safety
standards. Codex is a voluntary standard-setting body of the World Health
Organization and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization established
in 1962 to facilitate international trade. Codex is made up of government
officials assisted by industry advisors. National food corporations and
trade groups such as Hershey Foods, Nestle U.S.A., Kraft General Foods,
Coca-Cola Company, Pepsi Company, Grocery Manufacturers of America,
and the National Food Processors Association have been present at Codex
meetings.51 A recent study reported that over eighty percent of the non-
governmental participants on national delegations to recent Codex com-
mittees represented industry, while only one percent represented public
interest organizations.5 2
Although Codex unquestionably deals with matters of significant pub-
lic importance, it has historically operated without adequate mechanisms
for obtaining public input. Codex meetings are closed to the general pub-
lic. Draft standards are not made public until well into the process, and
the public may not provide input directly into the process. Rather, mem-
bers of the public must persuade a governmental participant to present
their positions to Codex. In recent years, some consumer and environ-
mental organizations have attended Codex meetings and have sought to
make Codex more open and participatory. Consumer and environmental
representation, however, has remained sporadic and Codex has not yet
significantly reformed its processes to ensure more meaningful public
49. See infra part IV.A.5.
50. See, e-g., Citizen Groups Score Leaked NAFTA Draft; USTR Declines to Verify Its Accu-
racy, 9 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) at 516 (Mar. 25, 1992); U.S., Mexico and Canada Plan to
Establish Trade Commission, 9 Int'l Trade Rptr. (BNA) at 1328-29 (Aug. 5, 1992).
51. See Mark Ritchie, GA7T, Agriculture and the Environment: The U.S. Double Zero
Plan, 20 EcOLOGISr, Nov./Dec. 1990, at 214; 56 Fed. Reg. 29,050-51 (1991).
52. NATALIE AvERY Er AL., NATIONAL FooD ALLiAN cE, CRACKING THE CODEX: AN
ANALYSIS OF WHO SEiS WORLD FOOD STANDARDS 1 (1993).
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participation. 53
The process for resolving disputes under trade agreements further
underscores the flaws in the system. Again the process is characterized by
excessive secrecy, input limited to governmental representatives, and deci-
sion-makers with an inherent bias toward trade liberalization at the
expense of other values.
A GATT dispute is resolved in a manner that is roughly analogous to a
judicial proceeding. If consultations fail to resolve a dispute, a party may
file a complaint which leads to the establishment of a dispute settlement
panel composed of trade bureaucrats and attorneys. Then, the parties
prepare written submissions laying out their respective positions, and they
present oral arguments to the panel. Both the submissions and the oral
arguments present factual information and legal analysis. Although GAT
panel decisions do not technically have precedential value, submissions
and decisions cite past panel decisions as authority for controlling inter-
pretations of GATT provisions.54
Although the purpose and tenor of the proceeding is analogous to a
U.S. judicial proceeding, the manner in which it is conducted is com-
pletely different. First, the decision-makers are not neutral. GATT panels
have historically been comprised of individuals who are schooled in the
GATT system and who favor trade deregulation. The Uruguay Round
would perpetuate this bias in its explicit requirements that panel members
have experience in the international trade system.55
Second, not only are trade panels comprised of proponents of the
current trade regime, but there are no safeguards against conflicts of
interest. Panel members need not disclose financial interests related to
the outcome of the dispute. Further, panel members are not precluded
from serving on a dispute settlement panel if they have such an interest.
In a recent dispute involving Canadian lumber under the U.S.-Canada
Free Trade Agreement, the United States charged that the panel decision
is tainted because two Canadian members of the panel belong to law firms
that have represented the Canadian lumber industry or the Canadian gov-
ernment.56 A U.S.-Canada dispute settlement panel found such a conflict
53. The International Organization of Consumers Unions (IOCU) attends Codex
meetings as an official observer. It has advocated for increased consumer participation
in Codex proceedings, and in 1991, Codex endorsed an IOCU recommendation to do
so. Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius: Report of the
Nineteenth Session, 10, 11, app. 4 (1991) [hereinafter Report of the Nineteenth Codex
Session]. However, citizen participation has not increased since that time. PUBLIC Cm-
ZEN AND ENVIRONMENTAL WORKING GROUP, TRADING AWAY U.S. FOOD SAFEY 54 (1994).
54. See, e.g., Thailand Panel Report, supra note 31; First Submission of the United
States to the GATT Panel on United States-Taxes on Automobiles (Oct. 22, 1993) (public
version) (on file with the Comell International Law Journal); Second Submission of the
United States to the GATT Panel on United States-Taxes on Automobiles (Nov. 29, 1993)
(public version) (on file with the Cornell International LawJournal); see also United States-
Taxes on Automobiles, GATT Doc. DS31/R (Sept. 29, 1994) (report of the panel).
55. Dispute Settlement; supra note 35, § 8.1.
56. Peter Behr, Administration Pursuing Canadian Lumber Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
1994, at Cl, C4.
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of interest perfectly permissible.
Third, there is no mechanism for appealing a GATT panel decision to
a neutral, outside body. Currently, a GATT panel decision is presented to
the contracting parties who routinely adopt it soon after its issuance. The
only check is the practice of adopting panel reports by consensus. This
practice enables a single GATT member to block adoption of the report, if
it is willing to take the political heat for doing so. However, the practice of
blocking would be eliminated under the Uruguay Round, and it is not
incorporated into other recent trade agreements.
Although the Uruguay Round would establish a right to appeal a
panel decision, that appeal would be decided by a standing body of trade
lawyers under the auspices of the World Trade Organization.5 7 Since the
GATT and the WTO have a vested interest in the GATT rules and their
trade liberalization goals, it is fundamentally unfair to make these institu-
tions the final arbiters of disputes arising under GATT rules.
Fourth, when a GATT contracting party lodges a trade challenge,
GATT rules and informal procedures cloak the dispute in secrecy until the
GATT Council adopts the determination of the dispute settlement
panel.58 It is only then that the GATT Secretariat will release the panel
decision to the public, even though prior to that time it is released to the
more than 100 countries who are contracting parties to the GATT, and
leaks are not uncommon. 59 Panel proceedings are held in closed session,
with only governmental representatives of the disputing parties permitted
to attend. Even after the proceeding has been concluded, no transcripts
of panel hearings are made public.
The express terms of the most recent trade agreements mandate this
secrecy. Previously, secrecy was not an explicit requirement of the agree-
ment, but was derived solely from internal working procedures which eas-
ily could be changed. Thus, NAFTA requires that "the panel's hearings,
deliberations and initial report, and all written submissions to and com-
munications with the panel shall be confidential." 60 It also prohibits the
panels from "disclos [ing] which panelists are associated with majority and
minority opinions" in their initial and final reports.6 1 Even its provision
for making panel decisions public is neither immediate nor absolute; it
requires that the final report be published 15 days after it is distributed to
the parties, but permits the parties to decide not to make it public at that
time.62
Similarly, the Uruguay Round requires that written submissions and
panel proceedings be confidential and that any opinions expressed by
57. Dispute Settlement, supra note 35, § 17.
58. GATT' Office of Legal Affairs, Suggested Working Procedures 11 2-3.
59. John Jackson, World Trade Rules & Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1255 (1992).
60. NAFMA, supra note 1, art. 2012(1)(b).
61. Id. art. 2017(2).
62. Id. art. 2017(4).
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individual panelists be anonymous. 63 Although a country may make its
own submissions public, which it obviously must retain the power to do, it
may not disclose any information that another country has designated
confidential. 64 Nothing in the agreement defines confidential or imposes
any other limits on a country's ability to designate information
confidential.
One of the few procedural gains in the Uruguay Round is that a party
to a dispute must, "upon request of a Member, provide a non-confidential
summary of the information contained in its written submissions that
could be disclosed to the public."6 5 Only a Member country can make
such a request, and there are no safeguards to ensure that the summary
will reveal the full thrust of the secret submission. Public Citizen pressed
the European Union (EU) to release its submissions in support of its chal-
lenge to the U.S. fuel economy penalties and gas guzzler tax. Although
the EU eventually released its complaint, that document devoted less than
one page to describing both the penalties and tax with a citation to the
GATr articles on which the challenge was predicated.66 In preparing
their defense of the measures, Public Citizen and the Center for Auto
Safety were able to address many of the EU's arguments only after they
reviewed the redacted version of the U.S. submission. Although the U.S.
submission disclosed the gist of many of the EU's arguments, the redac-
tions concealed many key contentions and much of the factual support.
Public Citizen and the Center for Auto Safety supplied the USTR with
factual information to rebut many of the EU's arguments and almost cer-
tainly would have been able to assist further in this manner had they been
able to review the full EU submissions. The excessive secrecy likely
deprived the panel of relevant information.
Fifth, dispute settlement panels generally lack the perspective of the
proponents of measures that restrict trade in order to promote other
social values. Given their trade backgrounds, the panelists do not have
this expertise. Although recent trade agreements permit dispute panels to
obtain expert input from individuals or expert bodies, the desire to obtain
such input must come from the panel or the disputing parties.67 Outsid-
ers (which includes states, members of Congress, and even the nontrade
agencies who are not presenting the case) have no way to alert the panel
to the need for experts or to supply information or arguments that would
be useful. There are no safeguards to ensure that the expert input is
objective, balanced, or free of conflicts of interest. There also is no mech-
anism for nongovernmental entities and other outsiders to make amicus
submissions to trade dispute settlement panels. Public Citizen and the
63. Dispute Settlement, supra note 35, §§ 14.1, 14.3, 17.10, 17.11, app. 3 § 3.
64. Id. § 18.2, app. 3 § 3.
65. Id. § 18.2.
66. United States-Taxes on Automobiles, Request for the Establishment of a Panel under
ArtideXYJIL2 by the European Economic Community, GATr Doc. DS31/2 (Mar. 12, 1993).
67. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 2014-15; TBTAgreemen; supra note 1, art. 14.2, annex
2, para. 1; SPS Agreemen supra note 1, para. 36; Dispute Settlemen4 supra note 35, § 13.
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Center for Auto Safety prepared a defense of the fuel economy penalties
and gas guzzler tax based on their longstanding advocacy for and monitor-
ing of those measures, but there was no mechanism for them to present
that document to the panel.6
As this discussion demonstrates, the process of negotiating and imple-
menting international trade agreements is in dire need of reform. The
establishment of global economic policy should not be shrouded in such
extensive secrecy and should not be devoid of avenues for public participa-
tion. Reform is particularly imperative because international trade agree-
ments and disputes are seeking to dictate other social policies. It is not
surprising that trade experts meeting in secret without public input have
decided that the goal of unencumbered trade should trump most other
policy goals. It is both unwise and unfair to permit trade insiders to make
decisions that affect environmental, health, and safety policy without
opening the process to scrutiny and participation by the people affected
by those decisions.
Of course, reforming a system comprised of more than 100 nations is
no small task. For this reason, the place to start making reforms is at
home. Domestic reforms will help facilitate international reforms and will
ensure that the United States' own participation in the trade system abides
by this nation's democratic values.
M. Core Democratic Principles Should Govern U.S. Formulation of
Trade Policies
The U.S. government must reform the way it formulates trade policy and
participates in international trade processes. The core democratic princi-
ples that should be incorporated into all facets of U.S. trade policy-making
activities are openness, public participation, neutrality, and accountability
of both the decision-makers and the decision-making process.
Domestic policy-making, whether in the form of law-making, rule-
making, or judicial proceedings, is conducted in the public eye. This
ensures that the public can learn what is being considered and what has
been adopted by government decision-makers. It also allows the public to
provide input into the process. Openness helps instill confidence in the
process and garner public support for the results. It also enables the pub-
lic to hold decision-makers accountable for their decisions and for the
manner in which their decisions are reached.
Domestic legislative, rule-making, and judicial processes also afford
the public opportunities to submit their views in the form of testimony,
public comments, or amicus briefs. These avenues for public participation
68. Patti A. Goldman & Cornish F. Hitchcock, Public Citizen Litigation Group,
Statement of Public Citizen & Center for Auto Safety on the European Communities'
Challenge to the U.S. Fuel Economy Penalties and Gas Guzzler Tax (Nov. 24, 1993) (on
file with the Cornell International Law Journal). Public Citizen asked the USTR to attach
this document to the U.S. submission to the panel, but the USTR refused. Although
Public Citizen then sent the document to the GAT, there was no mechanism to pro-
vide it to the panel.
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maximize the range of relevant information, arguments, and perspectives
available to the governmental decision-makers and often improve the
quality of the final decision.
Numerous safeguards are built into our domestic decision-making
processes to ensure accountability of both the decision-makers and the
process. Openness and public participation support this goal, as does
making public the identities of the decision-makers associated with partic-
ular decisions. Similarly, on-the-record decision-making ensures that all
the information considered by the decision-maker is available to the pub-
lic. This guards against secret, undue influence on the decision-maker. It
also makes it easier to understand the basis for past decisions and to pre-
dict the outcome of future disputes.
In addition, domestic policy-makers, whether they are elected or
appointed, are subject to numerous ethical and procedural safeguards.
Unelected officials must not have a conflict of interest with respect to mat-
ters under consideration. Further, any interest, financial or otherwise,
that does not rise to the level of a conflict, must be disclosed to ethics
officers and often to the public.69 Advisory bodies must reflect a balance
of viewpoints on the matters before them. They must also not be unduly
influenced by special interests. 70 In addition, decision-makers must not
perform other functions that threaten their neutrality. Thus, mediators
do not serve asjudges, and advocates for one position may not also be the
decision-maker.
These principles ensure that the process and its results are fair, easily
accessible to the public, and based on a full airing of the underlying issues.
When policies are established without adherence to these principles, the
quality of the decision-making is diminished. If this happens, the public
loses confidence in the process and may be unwilling to accept the results.
Closed processes that lack avenues for public input tend to be skewed
toward economic interests that often have the resources and/or connec-
tions to ensure that their views are heard by the decision-makers. Back-
room deals and catering to special interests may prevail over reasoned
judgments.
As discussed in the previous section, the international trade regime
does not abide by these democratic principles. Accordingly, when trade
policy-making is shifted from domestic arenas to international ones, the
decisions are no longer made openly. There is no public input to officials
who are accountable to the American public through the ballot box or
through U.S. ethical and procedural safeguards. More importantly for the
purposes of this article, the U.S. government has modelled its participa-
tion in the international trade system after dosed domestic systems for
dealing with foreign affairs and national security matters. That model
does not fit the domestic policy issues being shaped by trade agreements.
69. 18 U.S.C. §§ 205, 207, 208 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Ethics in Government Act, 5
U.S.C. App., § 401-408 (Supp. V 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1988).
70. Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 5(b)-(c) (1988).
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Trade negotiations, implementation, and dispute resolution are con-
ducted principally by a foreign affairs agency accustomed to operating
behind closed doors with extensive industry input but little public over-
sight or citizen involvement. The existing trade policy structure has no
mechanism for obtaining a balanced perspective on environmental,
health, and safety issues. Nor is it designed to facilitate a full exchange of
diverse viewpoints. These closed, one-sided proceedings lack credibility
and are immediately suspect in the eyes of those who are excluded.
IV. Democratizing Domestic Trade Policy-making Activities
A comprehensive set of reforms is necessary to ensure that U.S. trade pol-
icy-making activities are governed by the democratic principles of open-
ness, public participation, and accountability. This section describes
various pitfalls of the current U.S. model, and proposes reforms to make
U.S. trade policy-making more democratic with respect to: (A) the negoti-
ation and approval of trade agreements, (B) domestic implementation of
these agreements, and (C) U.S. participation in dispute settlement
proceedings.
A. The Negotiation and Approval of Trade Agreements
Development of U.S. negotiation positions and U.S. participation in inter-
national trade negotiations is characterized by excessive secrecy, inade-
quate attention to and concern for environmental and public health
values, a lack of opportunities for public input, undue industry influence,
and unchecked executive branch power to trade away domestic preroga-
tives in an effort to promote social values in ways that impinge upon inter-
national trade. The executive branch's flawed negotiating activities are
tolerated and even promoted by Congressional abdication of decision-
making authority due to the fast-track procedures governing congressional
approval of trade agreements.
Congress should ensure that agencies, whose missions are being
affected by trade, and states have an institutionalized role in developing
U.S. trade policy and that the negotiation, congressional oversight, and
approval processes be reformed to give Congress greater control over the
development of U.S. and international trade policies. In addition, to assist
in achieving these goals, the process of negotiating trade agreements
should be more open, environmental impact statements should be pre-
pared on trade agreements, and the existing trade advisory committee sys-
tem should be restructured to be more balanced and open.
1. Who Decides?-Environmental and Health Agencies Should Have a
Statutorily Mandated Role in the Development of U.S. Trade Policy, and
States Should Retain Their Authority Over State Laws.
The identities and perspectives of governmental decision-makers affect
the policies that are developed. A U.S. agency charged with protecting the
environment or food safety has a much different perspective than one
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charged with promoting economic development or international trade.
Similarly, federal trade officials may be more willing than state politicians
and regulators to compromise state laws.
U.S. trade and foreign policy officials conduct international trade
negotiations secretly. Until recently, environmental and health officials
were excluded from the negotiating loop. The NAFTA negotiations
embarked upon a new practice of including environmental and health
agencies in the development of U.S. negotiation positions. Through this
process, for example, EPA brought to the USTR's attention the adverse
effects that some of the proposed NAFTA language might have on domes-
tic environmental standards.
Ultimately, however, the USTR had full control over U.S. positions.
The environmental and health agencies had a role only to the extent per-
mitted by the USTR. Under this arrangement, the ability of the environ-
mental and health agencies to affect trade policy is left to the whims of the
USTR.
Although the Clinton Administration has reportedly been more
receptive to the concerns raised by environmental and health agencies, it
has ensured that trade and national security agencies maintain control
over U.S. trade policy. Thus, when the Clinton Administration formulated
a policy on the circumstances in which trade sanctions or other trade
measures may be used to promote environmental objectives, it gave the
National Security Council (NSC) primary responsibility for its develop-
ment. The NSC proceeded without any public notification, without pub-
lishing a proposal in the Federal Register, and without soliciting public
comments. It was not untilJanuary 1994, six months after the NSC began
developing the policy, that a select group of environmental organizations
was invited to attend a meeting at which the NSC provided a general
description of the policy but did not reveal its actual terms.71
Because the policy was developed under the auspices of the NSC, few,
if any, EPA staff were involved in its development. Nevertheless, even
though the policy still has not been published or otherwise made public, it
has been relied upon by officials from the State Department, the NSC, the
Department of Justice, and the Office of the USTR to discourage EPA
from supporting statutory restrictions on the export of domestically pro-
hibited or restricted pesticides. The non-EPA officials argued that the so-
called "circle of poisons legislation" would use trade restrictions to pro-
mote health and environmental goals outside the United States in viola-
tion of the NSC policy.
EPA, rather than the NSC, should direct the development of U.S. pol-
icy on the use of trade measures to pursue environmental goals. EPA (and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) are intimately
familiar with the use of trade measures to promote environmental goals.
71. NEC Proposes Guidelines for Trade Measures to Protect Environmen INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Jan. 21, 1994, at 1, 13; Interview with Lori Wallach, Public Citizen (Jan. 21,
1994).
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EPA's perspective is directed at promoting environmental goals, while the
NSC, like the USTR and the State Department, is more concerned with
trade and foreign relations implications. In addition, NSG staff may pos-
sess little familiarity with the underlying environmental goals and mecha-
nisms for achieving them. Moreover, EPA routinely establishes policies
through notice and comment rule-making. In contrast, the NSC rarely
notifies or includes the public in its policy-making activities, and it even
classifies (and thus conceals) many of its final policy decisions. The EPA
model for developing policy statements is far more consistent with demo-
cratic decision-making than is the NSC approach.
To ensure that environmental and health protection concerns are
given priority and to facilitate democratic decision-making, environmental
and health agencies should have a statutorily mandated role in the devel-
opment of U.S. trade policy. This would prevent NSC or USTR domina-
tion of the process of establishing U.S. policies on overlapping trade and
environmental matters. It would also help to prevent the USTR from trad-
ing away food safety protections and injecting himself/herself into domes-
tic environmental policy-making.72
Congress should mandate that any agency with responsibility over a
matter that would be affected by trade policies, negotiations, or policy
implementation have an equal voice with the USTR in developing the U.S.
position. To accomplish this, Congress should amend 19 U.S.C.
§ 2171(c) (1), which delineates the duties of the USTR and the Deputy
USTRs. Thus, while the USTR would retain responsibility for the conduct
of international trade negotiations, he/she would not have exclusive
responsibility for developing U.S. negotiating positions that affect the mis-
sions of other U.S. agencies.73 Furthermore, the USTR would no longer
have primary responsibility for developing and coordinating the imple-
mentation of international trade policy if such policies concern a matter
within the jurisdiction of another domestic agency. Instead, the domestic
agency would have primary responsibility.7 4
72. See supra part I (discussion concerning methyl bromide and reformulated gas);
Steve Charnovitz, The World Trade Organization and Environmental Supervision, 17 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) at 90 (Jan. 26, 1994). During the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
the USTR actively challenged restrictions imposed by Asian countries on the sale and
promotion of U.S. cigarettes. Even though Surgeon General C. Everett Koop and Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan had sought to curtail domestic
cigarette use, they were largely shut out of the process of establishing the U.S. position
on expanding cigarette consumption abroad. Greg Rushford, Tobacco Row: USTR Bat-
tles Anti-Smoking Rules in Taiwan, Sparking Showdown with Health Advocates, 14 LEGAL
TIMES 1, 18 (1992); Morton Mintz, Tobacco Roads: Delivering Death to the Third World,
PROGRE SIE 24, 29 (1991). Greater involvement of environmental and health agencies
in developing U.S. trade policy would facilitate greater consistency between the U.S.
domestic and international trade agendas.
73. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(C) (1988).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c) (1) (A). Similarly, the USTR could continue to issue policy
guidance to agencies on basic trade issues as long as it does not supplant the agencies'
role in developing policies in their areas ofjurisdiction, even where those policies affect
international trade. 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c) (1) (D).
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The Trade Acts should be amended to require that the USTR consult
with states on trade issues that affect those states. The NAFrA Implemen-
tation Act provides for consultations with the states.75 Although the con-
sultation system is principally concerned with ensuring state compliance
with NAFTA, it allows states to submit their views to the USTR. Further, it
requires the USTR to take those views into account when developing U.S.
positions for implementation of NAFTA and for dispute settlement sub-
missions that directly affect the states.76 This consultation system should
be extended to other trade agreements and to the development of trade
negotiating positions.
However, unless the states have final poliiical control over trade-pre-
cipitated changes in state laws, there is 'no guarantee that their voice will
be given any weight in the development of U.S. trade policy. Currently,
the federal government has the power through preemption, withholding
federal funds, and litigation to compel changes in state laws that conflict
with a trade agreement.77
However, the federal government has been more willing than the
states to sacrifice state safety protections. For example, the United States
and Mexico entered into a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding granting
reciprocal recognition of Mexican commercial drivers' licenses. Thereaf-
ter, the Department of Transportation preempted the states from requir-
ing Mexican drivers to obtain state commercial drivers' licenses and made
it clear that non-complying states could lose federal highway funds.78
Mexican licenses are based on different medical requirements, hazardous
materials proficiency standards, and sanctions, and they last more than
twice as long as California licenses. Due to these differences, the Califor-
nia legislature directed the California Department of Motor Vehicles to
continue enforcing California's commercial drivers' licenses require-
ments.79 When the Federal Highway Administration threatened to with-
hold federal highway funds, however, the California DMV decided to
recognize the Mexican licenses.8 0
During the NAFTA debates, California urged the USTR to leave the
modification of state laws to state political processes, rather than permit
the federal government to sue states to compel changes in their laws.81
California argued that state legislators and state regulators, rather than
federal trade negotiators, should be empowered to decide whether to
75. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 102(b) (1).
76. Id. §§ 102(b) (1)(B) (iii), (iv), (v).
77. Patti A. Goldman, The Legal Effect of Trade Agreements on Domestic Health and Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 7J. ENvTL. L. & Lrr. 11, 53-55 (1992).
78. 57 Fed. Reg. 31,454 (1992).
79. Cal. Con. Res. 128, ch.70 (1992).
80. Letter from M.J. Hannigan, Commissioner, Dept. of California, Highway Patrol,
to Hon. Richard Katz, California State Assembly, (Aug. 7, 1992) (on file with the Cornell
International Law Journal) [hereinafter California Highway Patrol Letter].
81. Letter from Ira H. Goldman, Governor's Trade Representative, and James
Strock, Secretary, California Environmental Protection Agency, to Michael Kantor,
USTR, (Aug. 3, 1993) (on file with the author).
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change their laws to accommodate trade concerns. The NAFTA imple-
menting legislation did not, however, leave modifications of state laws to
the state political process. Instead, it authorized the federal government
to bring lawsuits to compel changes in state laws.82 If the states are to
participate meaningfully in the development of trade policies that affect
their interests, they must retain control over the viability of their laws.
With that power, the USTR may give their views more weight, even if the
USTR retains full control over trade agreement implementation and dis-
pute settlement positions.
2. Fast-Track Procedures Should Be Eliminated or Revamped to Give Congress
Greater Control over the Development of U.S. Trade Policy.
a. The current fast-track rules abdicate too much congressional control
over trade policy.
The process for congressional approval of trade agreements is in dire
need of reform. At present, congressional approval of a trade agreement
is not governed by ordinary congressional procedures, but by fast-track
procedures, which drastically reduce the opportunities for Congress and
the public to shape the terms of an agreement. These procedures were
developed in the early 1970s after Congress refused to approve one aspect
of the Kennedy Round of GATT agreements and undercut other provi-
sions in the U.S. implementing legislation. The procedures are predi-
cated on the postulate that the President and his Administration will be
unable to negotiate multilateral trade agreements unless our trade part-
ners know, in advance, that Congress will not dismantle those agreements.
To initiate the fast-track process, the President must notify Congress
that he is negotiating a trade agreement under fast-track procedures.8 3
Congress may remove the agreement from the fast-track process by a vote
of both houses in any sixty-day period or by a disapproval vote of either the
Senate Finance Committee or the House Committee on Ways and Means
within sixty days of the President's notification. 84
To retain fast-track authority, the President must consult with certain
congressional committees about the nature of the agreement, the extent
to which the agreement will achieve statutory negotiating objectives, and
the implementation of the agreements 5 The House Committee on Ways
and Means and the Senate Finance Committee (the "gatekeeper commit-
tees") must be consulted with respect to all trade agreements; other com-
mittees must be consulted when the agreement would affect subject
matters over which they have jurisdiction.8 6 Most of these consultations
take place in secret, although the committees occasionally hold public ses-
82. NAFTA Implementation Act, § 102(b) (2), (c); Approval of U.S.-Can. Free
Trade Agreement and Relationship of Agreement to U.S. Law, Pub. L. No. 100-449,
§ 102(b) (3), 102 Stat. 1852, 1853 (1988).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(c) (3) (C) (1988).
84. Id § 2903(c) (1) (A), (c) (2).
85. Id. § 2902(d).
86. Id. § 2902(d) (1).
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sions to report on general developments. Moreover, many of the health
and environmental committees were not consulted regularly during either
the NAFIA or the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The President must notify Congress ninety calendar days before he
enters into a trade agreement.87 Typically, the President notifies Congress
once the negotiations have led to a final agreement. Thus, the President
issued the ninety-day-notice for NAFTA after the USTR released a text of
the agreement; for the Uruguay Round, notification occurred as soon as
the non-tariff trade barrier negotiations were completed.88
The President may enter into (i.e., sign) the agreement at the expira-
tion of the notice period. Thereafter, he may submit to Congress the
signed trade agreement, legislation approving and implementing it, and
the required supporting information.8 9 A non-tariff trade barrier agree-
ment may not enter into force (i.e., become effective) with respect to the
United States unless Congress has enacted legislation approving it.90
The absolute bar on amendments to both the trade agreement and its
implementing legislation is the most undemocratic feature of the fast-
track rules. 91 In other words, the legislation submitted by the President is
the exact legislation upon which Congress must vote. Through the no-
amendment rule, Congress relinquishes much of its power to determine
the terms of trade agreements. That power accretes to the President, who
can alone determine what will be negotiated and what limits will be placed
on domestic prerogatives. Because they must vote "yes" or "no" on the
entire package, the stakes are high; members of Congress may be unwill-
ing to reject the entire agreement, even though they may disagree vehe-
mently with particular components of it.
Although the trade agreement may not be amended, significant
domestic issues are resolved in the implementing legislation. For exam-
ple, the implementing legislation dictates the legal effect that the trade
agreement will have on both federal and state laws. It also amends
existing statutes to bring them into conformity with the trade agreement.
Indeed, the NAFTA implementing legislation amended several public
health statutes without any congressional hearings or debate, even though
it is by no means clear that those particular amendments were compelled
by the NAFTA legislation.92 In addition, at one point a draft of the Uru-
87. Id. § 2903(1)(A). That period was extended to 120 calendar days for the Uru-
guay Round. Pub. L. No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239 (1993) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 290
(1988)).
88. 57 Fed. Reg. 43,603 (1992); 58 Fed. Reg. 67,263 (1993).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(1)(B) (1988).
90. Id § 2191(b) (1) (A); Id § 2903(a) (1) (C). For the Uruguay Round, tariff agree-
ments similarly may not become effective until after Congress has approved the non-
tariff trade barrier Uruguay Round agreements. Pub. L. No. 103-49, 107 Stat. 239
(1993).
91. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1988).
92. An early draft of the NAFTA implementing legislation incorporated the
NAFTA's constraints on food safety measures, which would have given those rules
domestic legal effect and made them enforceable against federal agencies under the
Administrative Procedure Act.
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guay Round implementing legislation included an extension of fast-track
authority for future trade agreements, and the final bill contained budget
cuts and revenue-raising measures to offset revenue losses from the Uru-
guay Round tariff reductions.
Apart from statutory amendments, budget authorizations, and admin-
istrative mechanisms to implement NAFTA, the NAFTA implementing leg-
islation also contained many special favors designed to win support for the
NAFTA package.93 For example, the NAFTA Implementation Act pro-
vides for the establishment of a North American Development Bank,
which reportedly convinced at least one Representative to support
NAFTA.9 4 Similarly, an obscure provision pertaining to the retroactive
effect of NAFTA's local content requirements for obtaining preferred
tariff treatment reportedly wipes out millions of dollars in tariffs owed by
the Honda Corporation for failing to meet the local content rules under
the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. 9
5
Because the President wants to avoid unexpected problems, and Con-
gress wishes to participate, an informal process has evolved which includes
Congress in the development of the implementing legislation. The House
Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee hold
"nonhearings" and "nonmarkups" at which they consider and make
changes to the proposed implementing legislation. Other committees
with jurisdiction over matters affected by the agreement need not be
included in this process. 96 A "nonconference" committee reconciles any
differences in the respective versions of the House and Senate texts.
The usual congressional open meeting rules do not apply to these
non-proceedings. Therefore, they take place amidst greater secrecy than
normal. In addition, no transcripts are prepared, which prevents the pub-
lic from learning what transpired until a public report is issued. The only
public report of the NAFTA implementing legislation did not become
available until the legislation was introduced. This, of course, was too late
to enable the public to influence the terms of the legislation.
Once the fixed legislative package is introduced, congressional con-
sideration is truncated under fast-track procedures. Debate in either
house is limited to a maximum of twenty hours.97 Congressional commit-
tees have only forty-five legislative days to review the package, at the end of
which it is automatically referred to the full house. A floor vote must then
93. See PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA's BIzARR BAZAAR: TiH DEAL MArMNG THAT BouGrr
CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON NORTH Am mucm FRVzE TRADE AGREEMENT (1993).
94. NAFTA Implementation Act, §§ 541-544.
95. Id. § 202(c) (7); Peter Behr, dnalDeals Produce Surge of Suppor, WAsH. PosT, Nov.
17, 1993, at Al.
96. John Jackson, United States Law and Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation,
in IMPLMENTING THE Toxyo RouND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS & INTERNATIONAL Eco-
NOMIc RuLEs 163 (John Jackson et al., 1984).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(f) (2), (g)(2) (1988).
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be taken within fifteen legislative days. 98 In other words, Congress must
vote on the implementing legislation within sixty legislative days of its sub-
mission by the President.9 9 Under the fast-track's no-amendment rule,
this is a straight "yes" or "no" vote on the entire package; Congress may
not amend the trade agreement or the implementing legislation.1 00
While the fast-track procedures establish a maximum timetable for a
vote on the trade agreement, there is no requirement that the congres-
sional approval process must take the entire sixty- or ninety-day period.
Thus, for political reasons, the timetable for the congressional vote on
NAFTA was accelerated. The President submitted the implementation
legislation to .Congress on November 4, 1993, although it was not made
available to the public until several days later. The House voted less than
two weeks later on November 17, 1993, and the Senate voted the following
week on November 22, 1993.
In practice, the fast-track system has stymied Congress in ways that
were neither envisioned nor intended when Congress first approved the
fast-track scheme. Through fast-track procedures, Congress delegated
international trade negotiation authority to the President on the theory
that the President can make trade concessions because he represents the
nation as a whole. In contrast, Congress is considered unable to make
such concessions because its members protect the parochial interests of
their constituents.
However, trade agreements are no longer limited to tariff reductions
and other trade concessions. When fast-track rules originated, neither the
provisions of trade agreements nor disputes under them had begun
explicitly to address environmental, health, or safety matters. There were
no separate trade agreement provisions constraining domestic product
standards or food safety measures. International harmonization of such
standards had not surfaced as a trade goal, let alone as a mandate in trade
agreements. No trade disputes had been adjudicated with respect to
health, safety, environmental measures, or the GATT exceptions for con-
servation of exhaustible resources or the protection of life or health.
Trade negotiations are now establishing principles for determining
what types of domestic environmental, health, and safety protections will
be permissible. Congress is well-suited to making such policy judgments.
In fact, these matters are the subject of many titles of the U.S. Code, not to
mention volumes of federal regulations, state statutes, and state
regulations.
98. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). In calculating the time periods for
action in either House, the days on which that House is not in session are excluded. I&
§ 2191 (e) (3).
99. Where the implementing legislation contains revenue measures, the approval
period may be extended from 60 to 90 legislative days because revenue measures must
originate in the House of Representatives, and the House is assured of the full 60 days
to consider the trade package. Additional time is then permitted for Senate considera-
tion. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(e)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. 19 U.S.C. § 2191(d) (1988).
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Fast-track procedures now permit the President to usurp congres-
sional authority in environmental, health, and safety areas only tangen-
tially related to trade. They enable the President alone to decide what
matters will be the subject of trade negotiations and to negotiate terms
that will limit Congress's (and the state legislatures') ability to adopt
strong food safety protections, endangered species safeguards, or
phaseouts of harmful chemicals. The horse trading is no longer limited to
economic sectors. In fact, U.S. negotiators reportedly traded away certain
food safety prerogatives in order to gain investment rights in Mexico. The
President then presents those provisions as part of a take-it-or-leave-it pack-
age promulgated as a godsend for the economy. Although it may be that
few, if any, members of Congress would have voted for NAFTA's food
safety provisions standing alone, the stakes were too high for most mem-
bers to vote against the whole package based solely on its food safety
provisions.
Not only do the fast-track procedures severely truncate congressional
consideration of international trade agreements but they also engender
excessive secrecy and power plays by the few congressional committees
that are involved in the process. While an administration may decide to
release information about a trade agreement when the President is seek-
ing authorization to negotiate it under fast-track rules, secrecy tends to
develop once that authorization has been obtained. Thus, the USTR
made public promises that NAFTA would in no way jeopardize health,
safety, and environmental protections, but the USTR then denied the pub-
lic the opportunity to evaluate whether any of the proposals would have
such detrimental effects until after the agreement had been finalized. 1° 1
b. Fast-track procedures should be eliminated or greatly reformed.
Fast-track procedures have out-lived their usefulness and should not be
renewed. The last minute NAFTA renegotiations demonstrate that the
United States can return to its negotiating partners and exact additional
concessions in order to obtain congressional support for bilateral and tri-
lateral trade agreements. Long after the NAFTA agreement had been
signed by President Bush and his counterparts, the three countries re-
opened the negotiations to create Supplemental Agreements on Labor
and Environmental Cooperation, to establish a working-group on emer-
gency actions taken in response to import surges, to establish a North
American Development Bank, and to negotiate a price-based snapback of
tariffs for frozen concentrated orange juice.10 2
A strictly non-amendable trade agreement was not essential to the suc-
cessful negotiation of the entire agreement. If anything, the executive
branch's complacency resulting from the fast-track process led the Bush
101. See OFCE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REvIEW OF U.S.-MExico ENviRON-
MENTAL ISSUES (1992).
102. Can.-Mex.-U.S.: North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
32 I.L.M. 1480 (1993); Can.-Mex.-U.S.: North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion, 32 I.L.M. 1499 (1993); NAFTA Implementation Act, §§ 309, 541-44.
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Administration to negotiate the NAFTA without adequate regard for con-
gressional and public concerns. In order to obtain sufficient congres-
sional support for the agreement, the successor administration
ameliorated some of NAFTA's harshest effects by negotiating side deals
and by making many public statements about the agreement that con-
flicted with its actual terms. 103 If the no-amendment rule were eliminated,
the negotiators would pay more attention to public and congressional sen-
timent. Thus, the negotiated agreement would be more reflective of those
sentiments, even if Congress did not exercise its power to amend.
Since fast-track procedures stand in the way of effective congressional
oversight and public participation, they should be eliminated. Every time
an agreement has been negotiated and submitted under fast-track rules,
Congress has expressed its dissatisfaction with the system and tinkered
with the fast-track rules to give Congress more oversight. Thus, Congress
has required more consultations and provided for additional opportuni-
ties for Congress to vote on whether fast-track rules will apply.104 These
refinements of the fast-track rules, however, have neither provided an ade-
quate check on presidential power nor compensated for the loss of con-
gressional control occasioned by the no-amendment rule.10 5
The no-amendment rule should be eliminated. Instead, Congress
should be able to consider a trade agreement fully and make reservations
to specific provisions, as it does with international treaties. The NAFTA's
renegotiation demonstrated that the fast-track rules are not essential to
the negotiation of trade agreements involving few countries. Therefore, at
a minimum, there should be no fast-track process for bilateral trade agree-
ments, multilateral agreements involving fewer than five countries, or
accessions to NAFMA.
If fast-track rules are retained at all, they should be limited to trade
agreements involving five or more countries. Even for such agreements,
Congress should restructure the process to ensure that Congress and the
public have a meaningful voice in what may be traded away to liberalize
international trade.
103. Compare, e.g., Statement of Administrative Action, North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act, at 210 (1993), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 159, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 450, 659 (1993) (promising to make U.S. submissions public) with
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2012(1) (b) ("all written submissions to and communications
with the panel shall be confidential").
104. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 906, 98 Stat. 2948, 3050
(1984); Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100418, 102 Stat.
1107, § 1103(b) (1988).
105. Professor Harold Koh has argued that Congress still has the power to shape the
terms of a trade agreement and its implementing legislation, citing power plays by a
consortium of influential members of Congress who sit on the gatekeeper commit-
tees-Senate Finance and House Ways and Means-and by a powerful industry. Har-
old H. Koh, The Fast Track and United States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143, 150,
152 (1992). These examples prove the point that the fast-track process and the secrecy
and backroom deal-making that it generates enable powerful interests to have a role in
the development of trade agreements, while denying any comparable role to those who
are less powerful, such as consumers and the public at large.
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i. An affirmative congressional vote should be required to invoke fast-track
rules.
Instead of allowing the President to proceed under fast-track rules unless
Congress votes to deprive him of that authority, affirmative congressional
votes should be required to trigger fast-track authority. The President
should still be required to notify Congress publicly that he intends to initi-
ate negotiation of a particular trade agreement. Congress, however,
should subsequently be required to vote in favor of applying fast-track
rules to the negotiations.
ii. The President should be required to disclose to Congress and the public the
specific sectors and issues under negotiation.
Early in the negotiations, the President should be obligated to submit to
Congress a public report describing, with specificity, the nature of the mat-
ters under negotiation regarding every sector and set of issues (such as
food safety, technical barriers, intellectual property, and dispute settle-
ment). Had this been done for the NAFTA and Uruguay Round sanitary
and phytosanitary agreements, the President would have been required to
state whether there would be any provisions on such matters such as the
level of protection a country could pursue, the scientific basis for such
measures, risk assessment, equivalence, the least restrictive means for
achieving the goals, and state laws.
When President Bush faced congressional opposition to his request
for an extension of fast-track authority for the NAFTA and Uruguay
Round negotiations, he submitted to Congress and made public an
"Action Plan," which outlined U.S. goals for the NAFMA negotiations, pro-
vided background on controversial issues, and made certain commitments
to appease NAFTA's opponents.10 6 Congress should institutionalize this
type of formalized submission and specify its contents.
This report should be required independent of any presidential
request for fast-track authority. As discussed below, it would also serve to
inform both Congress and the public of the nature of the specific issues
for which the President seeks fast-track authority.
iii. The President should be required to obtain fast-track authority separately for
each sector and issue.
The President should be required to obtain fast-track authority separately
for each of the various sectors and issues either by adhering to statutorily
prescribed terms or by obtaining affirmative congressional authorization.
By adhering to statutorily prescribed provisions for the particular sector or
issue, the President could obtain fast-track authority. Congress would pre-
scribe sets of permissible rules to govern particularly sensitive subjects,
such as food safety and environmental standards, which have the potential
to affect a vast range of congressional prerogatives. If the trade agreement
106. Response of the Administration to Issues Raised in Connection with the Negoti-
ation of a NAFTA (Jan. 1991) (on file with author).
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were to incorporate those rules, it would be entitled to fast-track consider-
ation. If not, it would be subject to congressional oversight throughout its
development and possibly to congressional amendment later on.
If the trade agreement does not adhere to those rules, if there are no
rules on point, or if the President wants to obtain fast-track authorization
prior to the negotiation of rules in each of the statutorily prescribed areas,
he may request that Congress vote affirmatively to provide such authority.
However, he would need to obtain congressional fast-track authority sepa-
rately for each sector or issue under negotiation. Thus, if the President
identified twenty issues under negotiation, and Congress voted affirma-
tively with respect to fifteen, the President would have fast-track authority
only for those fifteen. The President could still negotiate in the other five
areas, but not under fast-track rules. Even as to the fifteen approved areas,
fast-track authority could be removed by a vote of both Houses within a
sixty-day period.' 0 7
The President would remain free to make additional public submis-
sions to Congress and to ask for new votes on whether additional specific
issues could be added to the fast-track rules package, even if Congress pre-
viously voted not to consider those matters under fast-track rules. How-
ever, if the final agreement deviates from the commitments made in the
President's Action Plan or from the statutorily prescribed terms, Congress
would be free to amend those aspects of the agreement and the imple-
menting legislation to conform them to the promises made or to the statu-
torily prescribed terms.
Because the President would be required to obtain fast-track authority
for each aspect of the agreement, this system would eliminate cross-
sectoral horse trading at the whim of the negotiators. Congress would
have a voice in whether food safety standards would be traded away for
investment rights in other countries. It would also enable Congress to
have greater scrutiny over some matters, either because they are more con-
troversial and of greater public concern or because they have a greater
effect on congressional prerogatives. Thus, Congress could refuse to grant
fast-track authority in advance for matters for which it has not developed
model provisions. Instead, Congress could wait until it has reviewed the
text or sufficient details of that aspect of the agreement and then decide
whether to apply the fast-track rules. This approach makes sense in areas
where the particular words used in the text dictate the viability of a whole
category of domestic measures, such as food safety and product standards
provisions.108
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(c) (1) (A) (1988) would need to be amended to allow the
removal of fast-track authority for specific sectors or issues.
108. There are variations in the penultimate Uruguay Round draft, the NAFTA text,
and the final Uruguay Round text on each of the matters listed above, which have led
the USTR and others to conclude that their reaches are very different. See, e.g., NAFMA
Statement of Administrative Action at 542-44; RODRIGOJ. PRUDENCIO ET Al, NATIONAL
WiLDLiF FEDERATION, THE ROAD TO MARRAKE: AN INTErM REPORT ON ENVRON EN-
TAL REFORM OF THE GATT AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE SYSTEm (1994).
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iv. The no-amendment rule should be eliminated.
The no-amendment rule should be eliminated except with respect to
those aspects of the agreement that parallel relevant statutorily prescribed
terms or that correspond to the specific terms set forth by the President in
his request for fast-track authority. If the final agreement deviates from
either the statutorily prescribed terms or the President's action plan, then
Congress may amend the agreement.
The no-amendment rule should also be abolished with regard to the
implementing legislation. The implementing legislation deals with mat-
ters of domestic law. Congress should have the ability to determine the
domestic legal effect of the agreement and the precise terms of statutory
amendments to conform U.S. statutes to the agreement. The particular
amendments to U.S. animal and meat inspection laws in the NAFTA
implementing legislation are not the only modifications that would con-
form those laws to NAFTA. Certainly less discretion could have been given
to USDA to achieve the same result. Yet because the amendments were
included in the NAFTA package, Congress never debated alternatives, nor
did the Administration everjustifiy the use of those particular amendments
instead of some other approach.
Instead of the no-amendment rule, Congress should impose strict rel-
evance requirements to limit the implementing legislation to what is
required to approve and implement the trade agreement. Under the
Trade Acts, the implementing legislation is, in theory, limited to what is
required or appropriate to carry out the agreement.10 9 In practice, how-
ever, special deals have been inserted to garner support from reluctant
members of Congress. Eliminating the no-amendment rule and relying
on public scrutiny may curtail the insertion of special favors in the imple-
menting legislation.
v. Ordinary legislative procedures should govern the development of
implementing legislation.
The process for development of the implementing legislation needs to be
revamped. The fast-track process operates under the fiction that the Exec-
utive Branch alone will develop and submit the implementing legislation
to Congress for approval. In practice, certain select congressional commit-
tees play a crucial yet highly secretive role. Congress should remove this
fiction and provide for the development of trade implementing legislation
under ordinary legislative procedures.
The development of the legislation should occur in public. Proposed
legislation should be made available to the public long before it is intro-
duced. Hearings, mark-ups, and conference committee proceedings
should also be public, and public transcripts should be prepared. All con-
gressional committees with jurisdiction over issues affected by the agree-
ment should have a full opportunity to hold hearings and debate aspects
of trade agreements that affect matters within their jurisdiction.
109. 19 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (2) (B) (III) (1988).
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This approach would stimulate public debate on the legislation at a
time when such debate could still affect its terms and could shape the
decision of whether to enact the legislation and approve the agreement.
Thus, proposals to make major changes in domestic laws, such as the
NAFTA Implementation Act's amendments to the animal and meat
inspection laws, would surface before introduction of the bill, when the
focus is on the agreement as a whole rather than its specific effects. Con-
gressional committees could hold hearings on the effects of such changes,
alternatives could be considered, and the final legislative product might
well be better.
Additional time beyond the ninety days in the current scheme should
be added to the timetable preceding submission of the implementing leg-
islation to Congress. This would provide more time to develop and review
the implementing legislation, including any modifications to domestic
law. Indeed, it took more than ninety days to develop the implementing
legislation for both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round. Once the legislation
is introduced, particularly if it is subject to a no-amendment rule, only
limited congressional debate and the final vote remain. This final stage
took less than three weeks for NAFIA. If amendments are not permitted,
less time can be allotted for congressional consideration of the final legis-
lation in order to give Congress more time to develop the legislation.' 10
vi. Fast-track rules should not apply to statutory amendments to implement
trade agreements.
As a related matter, fast-track procedures should not apply to statutory
amendments or enactments that implement trade agreements, as was per-
mitted for both the Tokyo Round of GATT and the U.S.-Canada Free
Trade Agreement."' Defenders of the agreements respond to charges
that trade agreements undermine U.S. power to adopt domestic health
and environmental protections with the contention that any changes to
domestic statutes still must go through the law-making process. However,
application of fast-track procedures to domestic law-making severely limits
committee consideration, floor debate, and congressional ability to offer
amendments. Likewise, public participation in the process of determining
domestic environmental and health safeguards is largely curtailed. The
ability of both Congress and the public to engage in full-ranging debate
and to employ all law-making tools at their disposal in order to promote
strong environmental and health laws must be preserved. For this reason,
fast-track procedures should never be applicable to legislation affecting
environmental, health, or safety matters, or state authority in these areas.
110. Koh, supra note 105, at 172-73.
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2504(e) (1988); Approval of U.S.-Can. Free Trade Agreement and
Relationship of Agreement to U.S. Law, Pub. L. No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851, § 102(e)
(1988).
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vii. Congress should mandate that the United States work toward the
democratization of the international trade system.
The current Trade Acts set forth the negotiating objectives of the United
States.' 12 The negotiating objectives outline the framework for the Execu-
tive Branch's initiation and conduct of trade negotiations. They also form
the foundation of various reports that are mandated by the Trade Acts to
accompany trade agreements submitted for congressional approval.1 13
Under these fast-track reforms, Congress would legislate standard trade
rules that would, if adhered to, give rise to automatic fast-track considera-
tion. Although negotiating objectives would have less importance in such
a system, Congress should still set forth goals that must be addressed in
Executive Branch reports."14
Most of the current negotiating objectives focus on eliminating barri-
ers to trade without concern for other values. A noteworthy exception to
this bias toward unencumbered trade is the directive
(A) to promote respect for worker rights; (B) to secure a review of the rela-
tionship of worker rights to GATT articles, objectives, and related instru-
ments with a view to ensuring that the benefits of the trading system are
available to all workers; and (C) to adopt, as a principle of the GATT, that
the denial of worker rights should not be a means for a country or its indus-
try to gain competitive advantage in international trade. 115
However, none of the administrations negotiating the Uruguay Round
heeded this directive, and thus, the worker rights objectives were not
achieved in the Uruguay Round.
The ease with which trade negotiators have ignored stated congres-
sional negotiating objectives underscores the ineffectiveness of the current
system. Congress cannot compel meaningful reform of the international
trade system through general directives unless it is given the power to
force negotiators to comply with express congressional mandates. If Con-
gress had the ability to ensure that trade negotiators would abide by such
mandates, which it would have under the fast-track reforms proposed
above, then Congress could direct the Executive Branch to democratize
112. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(a) (1988).
113. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(b) (2) (1988) ("A trade agreement may be entered into . . .
only if such agreement makes progress in meeting the applicable objectives described
in section 2901 of this title. . . ."); i& § 2903(a) (2) (B) (ii) (I) (President must explain
how agreement makes and does not make such progress); id. § 2155(e) (2) (advisory
committee reports must provide opinion on the extent to which agreement achieves
the applicable negotiating objectives).
114. Under the WTO, there may be no more comprehensive rounds of GATT nego-
tiations. Instead, the WTO would be permitted to initiate negotiations on an ongoing
basis, and the results of those negotiations may, in some instances, become binding on
the United States without a congressional vote. WTO Agreement supra note 48, art. IX,
§ 2; i. art. X. Therefore, the evaluation of whether the United States is achieving its
negotiating goals should no longer be tied to the submission of final agreements to
Congress. Rather, Congress should mandate periodic federal agency and advisory com-
mittee investigations and reports on the achievement of these reforms.
115. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(14) (1988).
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the international trade system. 1 6
In particular, Congress should restructure U.S. negotiating objectives
and emphasize the need for openness, public participation, and neutral
decision-makers and decision-making processes in international trade
negotiations, implementation activities, and in the resolution of disputes
under international trade agreements. 1 7 Reform of the negotiating
objectives for the international dispute settlement system should be even
more explicit.
The current negotiating objectives concerning dispute settlement
focus exclusively on making the system more effective and expeditious.
118
The Uruguay Round and NAFTA negotiations effectuated dispute settle-
ment systems that may well be expeditious and effective in promoting
trade liberalization at the expense of other values. Congress should
require the United States to take the lead in transforming this efficient
116. The recent attention to the adverse environmental and health consequences of
trade agreements calls for negotiating objectives to achieve sustainable development
and to lessen the adverse environmental, health, and safety effects of trade agreements.
See, e.g., OFFIcE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT.
CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNmES, (Background Paper, 1992); NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
1114; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEvELOPMENT, THE ENVIRoN-
MENTAL EFFECS OF TRADE (1994); TRADE AND THE ENVmONMENr: LAiW, ECONOMICS AND
POuCv (Durwood Zaelke et al. eds., 1993). President Clinton has promised to bring
these issues to the forefront of future trade initiatives. Proclamation 6641-To Imple-
ment the North American Free Trade Agreement, and for Other Purposes, 29 WEEKLY
CoMr. PaRs. Doc. 2596 (Dec. 15, 1993). Congress should mandate that the principal
negotiating objectives of the United States in future trade negotiations shall include:
(1) promoting sustainable development, (2) ensuring the viability of the earth's
resources, (3) facilitating trade rules that internalize the adverse health and environ-
mental consequences of production and market activities, (4) creating disincentives for
countries and their industries to permit degradation of the environment (in the
broadest sense of the term) to gain a competitive advantage in international trade, and
(5) maintaining full domestic prerogatives (including of state and local governments)
to protect the environment, public health and safety, consumers, and animal welfare,
including the employment of product standards and food safety measures. The United
States should be directed to work toward the adoption of international trade rules that
promote these objectives and to secure international reviews of the relationship
between GATT and other international trade rules and the achievement of these goals.
117. The Trade Acts direct the United States "to obtain broader application of the
principle of transparency and clarification of the costs and benefits of trade policy
actions through the observance of open and equitable procedures in trade matters by
Contracting Parties to the GATT." The concept of transparency is a more limited con-
cept than openness because it is often designed to ensure that governments, but not
necessarily the public, will receive information. For example, the Working Procedures
appended to the Uruguay Round Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes provide that "[i]n the interest of full transparency," panel
proceedings will be held in the presence of both parties. Dispute Settemen supra note
35, app. 3, para. 10. At the same time, the procedures require that those proceedings
be held in closed session. Id. para. 2. Obviously, such "transparent" proceedings are
not open, since the public is entirely shut out. The Uruguay Round implementing
legislation would require the U.S. Trade Representative to "seek" greater transparency
in GATT proceedings, including dispute settlement, and conflict of interest rules for
dispute settlement panelists. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 123(c), 126. This is a
step in the right direction.
118. 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1) (1988).
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dispute settlement machinery into a fair process. The U.S. negotiating
objectives should require dispute settlement to be open, to have neutral
decision-makers, and to provide opportunities for input from interested
parties, including environmental and consumer interests. The United
States should be directed to work towards the establishment of a dispute
settlement system that operates outside and independently of the GATT
and the WTO. This would ensure a neutral forum for determining the
balance between trade and social values.
Not only should the Executive Branch be required to evaluate and
report on its progress in achieving these negotiating objectives, but Con-
gress should also direct the Office of Technology Assessment to develop
methods of achieving these reforms and to assess the progress being made
toward obtaining them. If sufficient progress is not made, Congress
should compel the reforms through its power of the purse. Specifically,
Congress should refuse to fund U.S. participation in the flawed interna-
tional trade systems until reforms are made. Many members of Congress
endorsed a proposal that would have placed a moratorium on GATT dis-
putes until the flawed dispute settlement system could be overhauled.' 19
Unfortunately, no such moratorium was negotiated in the Uruguay
Round. If U.S. negotiators are unwilling to advocate necessary reforms or
are unable to obtain international agreement on them, Congress should
eliminate funding for U.S. participation in all trade dispute settlements or
at least in those involving domestic prerogatives such as environmental,
health, safety, consumer, or animal welfare protection. Funding should
cease until the international dispute resolution system is made more fair,
open, participatory, and accountable.
3. U.S. Trade Policy Should Be Openly Developed
Excessive secrecy permeates the process of negotiating and approving
international trade agreements. This secrecy is promoted by the current
fast-track process. Its detrimental effects are then compounded by the
trade advisory committee system, which gives hundreds of industries access
to information that is not shared with the general public. Meaningful
reforms of fast-track procedures, such as those proposed above, would
eliminate much of the secrecy facilitated by those procedures. Modifying
the trade advisory system, as discussed below, would decrease the pre-
ferred access industries have to information and the trade policy-making
apparatus.
In addition to those reforms, Congress should mandate that regular,
objective, and complete disclosures would be made to the public at signifi-
cant stages in the development of U.S. and international trade policies.
When draft agreements are disclosed to the trade advisory committees,
they should also be made available to the general public. By that time,
119. Letter from Representative Unsoeld and other members of the U.S. Congress,
to The Honorable WilliamJ. Clinton, U.S. President (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with the
Cornell International Law JournaO.
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they can hardly be considered secret because the negotiating countries
(which number more than 100 for GATT negotiations) and several hun-
dred domestic advisers have been privy to their terms. If some portions of
an agreement cannot be disclosed for discrete reasons, such as those set
forth in the Freedom of Information Act exemptions,' 20 then the USTR
should release as much as can be made public without revealing such
information. A summary, however, of the exempted information 'should
be prepared and released to the public.
Congress should also require each domestic agency to prepare an
analysis of how the trade agreement will affect its laws, regulations, and
programs. Many agencies prepared such an analysis of NAFTA, but those
analyses were not made public. These analyses should be prepared by the
substantive agencies, not the USTR, in order to provide a more informed
and candid assessment of the agreement's effects. They could be pre-
pared while the advisory committees are preparing their own reports on
the trade agreement, i.e., within thirty days after the conclusion of the
agreement. The WTO Agreement will transfer much of the international
trade policy-making from the negotiation of trade agreements to other less
formal mechanisms, many of which may not require congressional
approval. Therefore it would be advisable for Congress to mandate peri-
odic agency reports on the effect of trade agreements on agency
programs.
As a matter of practice, the USTR does not make the text of the agree-
ment available to the public until a final trade agreement has been com-
pleted. Of course, once the agreement has been completed, it is too late
to ameliorate any adverse effects of its provisions. Even then, it often takes
weeks, good connections, and money to obtain a copy of the agreement.
Although the parties to the NAFTA negotiations announced on August 12,
1992 that they had reached a final agreement (in time for the Republican
National Convention), the USTR did not release a copy to Congress or the
public until early September. Similarly, the parties announced on Decem-
ber 15, 1993 that they had concluded the Uruguay Round agreements, but
the USTR did not make copies available to the public until January 1994.
Even then, the agreement made public did not include the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Government Procurement of December 15,
1993.121 For months, the public was unable to obtain copies of that agree-
ment from the UST1R Finally, in March 1994, the GATT Secretariat in
Geneva, Switzerland, sent it to a U.S. organization in response to a
request. The full impact of that agreement on minority set aside programs
and state green procurement programs was set forth in other documents
not made available to the public until April 1994.
Finally, Congress should ensure the public full and easy access to
trade documents. It has also been exceedingly difficult for the general
120. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988).
121. Agreement on Government Procuremen GATT Doc. GPR/Spec/77 (Dec. 15, 1994)
(revised text expected to enter into force on Jan. 1, 1996).
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public to obtain advisory committee reports, USTR reports, the imple-
menting legislation, U.S. dispute settlement submissions, and other key
documents that have, in theory, been public documents. Congress should
require that all trade documents be made available to the public through
widely distributed publications, such as the Federal Register, federal deposi-
tory libraries, electronic means, and free copies at accessible locations.
4. Environmental Impact Statements Should Be Prepared on Trade Agreements
and Their Implementing Legislation.
The preparation of environmental impact statements is another way to
remedy the lack of public information about the development of trade
agreements and policies. An environmental impact statement objectively
analyzes the environmental ramifications of a proposed action and alter-
natives to it.122 Environmental impact statements improve the quality of
decision-making by involving the public in identifying and assessing the
environmental and health consequences of the proposed action and its
alternatives and by informing the decision-makers, the public, and Con-
gress of those environmental consequences.
The USTR has never prepared an environmental impact statement on
an international trade agreement. Rather, the USTR has maintained that
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which contains the envi-
ronmental impact statement mandate, is inapplicable to trade agreements.
At the same time, the USTR has acknowledged that agreements it has
negotiated in recent years will have significant environmental effects.
Indeed, in response to public and congressional demands, the USTR has
prepared analyses of these environmental effects, although it has refused
to do so under the NEPA framework established by Congress.
At the beginning of the NAFTA negotiations, the USTR started on
the right course. The USTR initiated an analysis of the environmental
issues likely to arise in the NAFTA negotiations by preparing a draft docu-
ment, soliciting public comment, holding public hearings, and issuing a
final document describing these issues.1 23 Since this document was pre-
pared at the outset of the negotiations, it informed the decision-makers of
the issues that would require further consideration and analysis.
However, the USTR then abandoned the task of analyzing environ-
mental effects for the next one and one-half years until a final version of
the NAFTA had been negotiated. Although the USTR prepared a final
environmental review at that time, it never acknowledged that NAFrA
could have any adverse effects on environmental protections, sustainable
development, or energy and other natural resources.' 24 In essence, the
122. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988).
123. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Draft Review of U.S.-Mexico Environ-
mental Issues (1991); OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRAD REFPREsENTATvE, RvEw OF U.S.-MEx-
ico ENVIRONMEWTAL ISSUES (1991).
124. CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, THE NAFTA: REPORT ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 106,
142, 147 (1993).
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USTR's final review was merely a political document designed to sell the
NAFTA to Congress and the public in the waning days of the debate.
It is precisely to guard against this type of one-sided, self-serving
report that NEPA requires a balanced, objective analysis of the environ-
mental effects of the agreement and the alternatives to it, such as the sta-
tus quo and variations on its terms. Under NEPA, this analysis must be
prepared before final decisions have been made. In this way, an environ-
mental impact statement serves as a vehicle for informing the public about
the agreement and its environmental effects and for improving the infor-
mation available to the negotiators and Congress. Ironically, by preparing
the initial NAFTA environmental review with public comments and hear-
ings, the USTR proved that such an endeavor is feasible.
Not only did the USTR prepare environmental reviews in connection
with NAMTA, but it also prepared an environmental review on the Uru-
guay Round.' 2 5 Thus, the USTR itself has acknowledged that it is possible
to assess the environmental effects of trade agreements. The key issue is
whether the USTR will have unfettered discretion to choose what environ-
mental aspects to access, when it will do so, and, most importantly,
whether the USTR will include the public in this process.
There is no need to search far and wide for a workable model to
assess the environmental effects of trade agreements; Congress established
the model in NEPA more than twenty years ago. The issue of whether
NEPA requires the USTR to prepare environmental impact statements
(EIS) on trade agreements has been considered by the courts for three
years without a definitive resolution. 126 Although the only court to reach
the merits held that "the plain language of the NEPA makes it a foregone
conclusion that the [USTR] must prepare an EIS on the NAFTA."12 7
Although the court of appeals reversed because it concluded that the
plaintiffs could not, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
obtain judicial review of the USTR's refusal to prepare an EIS on NAFTA,
the court never suggested that the USTR had no obligation to comply with
NEPA.12 8 Thus, under that decision, the USTR retains whatever obliga-
tions it has under NEPA, even though private litigants may not enforce
those obligations under the APA. 12 9
125. Report on Environmental Issues in the Uruguay Round Agreements, 59 Fed.
Reg. 9802 (1994).
126. The first case seeking EISs on the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round was dis-
missed because there were no final agreements in either of the negotiations at that
time. Public Citizen v. Office of the USTR, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
127. Public Citizen v. Office of the USTR, 822 F. Supp. 21 (D.D.C. 1993).
128. Public Citizen v. Office of the USTR, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), cet denied
114 S. Ct. 685 (1994). The Supreme Court declined to review the case presumably
because the Solicitor General argued that subsequent congressional approval of the
NAFMA rendered the case moot.
129. NEPA requires agencies to prepare EISs on their reports or recommendations
for legislative proposals and major federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1988). The author of this article has
been the lead litigator in the lawsuits to compel the USTR to comply with that obliga-
tion. Another case seeking an EIS on the Uruguay Round and the promulgation of
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Even if the USTR disagrees that NEPA applies to trade agreements, it
should look to NEPA for guidance in developing a system to assess the
environmental effects of trade agreements. No less an authority than Sec-
retary of State Warren Christopher recognized, while acting Secretary of
State in the Carter Administration, the value of an environmental impact
statement of the Panama Canal Treaty negotiations:
The National Environmental Policy Act has provided useful guidance in
drafting the Panama Canal Treaties so as to avoid or mitigate the adverse
environmental effects which might result from the implementation of the
treaties. We recognized the importance of NEPA procedures in formulat-
ing environmentally sound policies as well as the value of public participa-
tion in the NEPA review process.' 30
The USTR and many other trade experts are opposed to the notion
of applying NEPA to trade agreements. Their opposition is the result of a
fundamental misunderstanding of NEPA's requirements.
NEPA does not contain a rigid environmental impact statement
requirement that will tie the USTR's hands. Instead, the requirement is
flexible and designed to be adapted to each agency's individual statutory
responsibilities and programs.' 3 ' In fact, NEPA requires each agency to
develop procedures to tailor NEPA to its activities.' 3 2
The USTR should comply with this obligation by conducting a rule-
making proceeding, in consultation with the Council on Environmental
Quality and EPA, to determine precisely how to comply with NEPA for
trade agreements. Such a proceeding would draw on the USTR's exper-
tise in its trade activities and on other agencies' expertise in environmen-
tal impact statements. As a notice and comment proceeding, it would also
include input from outsiders with expertise in related matters and would
provide the USTR with a sense of the public demand for particular proce-
dures. The rule-making proceeding would address many challenges in
applying NEPA to this arena, such as the timing of the review and public
comment and the extent to which extraterritorial effects would be
considered.
To ensure that valuable information and a variety of perspectives are
injected into the trade negotiation process, the USTR should adopt a
hybrid of requirements for ordinary EISs and for EISs on legislative pro-
posals. The procedures for ordinary and legislative EISs differ in three
respects: (1) the scoping process through which the agency identifies the
environmental issues to be considered in further analyses is not required
for the legislative EIS, (2) only the draft EIS is prepared on legislative
rules implementing NEPA was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds without a decision
on the merits. Public Citizen v. Kantor, 864 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1994) (appeal
pending).
130. Statement on the Panama Canal Treaties and Environmental Protection, Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on the Panama Cana4 Committee on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1657-59 (1979).
131. 40 C.F.R §§ 1500.1(c), 1501.1(a), 1501.2, 1501.8, 1507.1 (1993).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1988); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.8, 1505.1, 1507.3 (1993).
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proposals, and (3) public comments are solicited on the draft legislative
EIS (after it is submitted to Congress) and are forwarded to Congress with
agency responses.' 33 The principal reason for the truncated legislative
EIS procedure is that the legislative proposal is raw material for the legisla-
tive process, which supplies ample means to develop an independent rec-
ord on the environmental effects of the proposal and the viable
alternatives.
Trade agreements do not fit the legislative model. Although the
request for congressional approval is a legislative proposal under NEPA,
that proposal is more than simply raw material for the legislative process.
The core proposal, i.e., the trade agreement, is fixed. Moreover, fast-track
rules limit congressional ability to develop its own informed analysis of the
agreement's effects. As a result, an EIS prepared only at the legislative
proposal stage would fail to inject environmental considerations into the
decision-making process at a time when they may affect the core decisions
being made. It is, therefore, critical to adhere to most of the ordinary EIS
procedures, along the lines of the following model.
First, a public scoping (or identification) process should take place
early in the negotiations.' 34 This process should be analogous to the
preparation of the initial review on environmental issues likely to arise in
the NAFTA negotiations. Since the scoping document looks at general
issues warranting consideration, it would not disclose any sensitive negoti-
ating positions. Therefore, it could be developed through a public pro-
cess, with opportunities for public comment and hearings, as was done
with the NAFTA review. Not only would this analysis inform the public
and the negotiators of the issues likely to arise, but it would also serve as an
early barometer of public and congressional reaction to the relevant envi-
ronmental issues.
Second, a draft EIS should be prepared during the negotiations so
that the decision-makers have an analysis of the environmental effects of
the proposals under consideration.' 35 The draft EIS should focus on the
trade agreement itself, something that was not done for NAFTA until
more than one year after the agreement was completed and that was done
for the Uruguay Round when the implementing legislation was being
drafted. Since the USTR would draft the EIS, it can ensure that the EIS
will not contain information that may compromise sensitive negotiating
positions or that was shared by other countries in confidence.
One of NEPA's most important requirements is that a draft EIS must
be released for public comment before the final decision has been
made.136 That requirement is apt here. The draft EIS could be a useful
mechanism for making information about the agreement public without
releasing a full text of the provisions under negotiation. Moreover, the
public should have an opportunity to provide input into the assessment of
133. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1993).
134. 40 C.F.R § 1501.7 (1993).
135. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (1993).
136. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1503, 1506.6 (1993).
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an agreement's environmental effects before the agreement is final. Pub-
lic comments may then be taken into account during further negotiations
and in preparing the final EIS.'3 7
Third, the final EIS, responding to public comments, could be final-
ized after the conclusion of the trade agreement. The final EIS would
focus on 1) any changes made in the trade agreement during the period
after release of the draft EIS, 2) the comments to the draft, and 3) the
specific provisions of the implementing legislation.13 8 It would supply a
complete analysis of any aspects of the agreement or implementing legisla-
tion that had not yet been fully assessed in the draft.
The final EIS should be submitted to Congress (and made available to
the public) along with the implementing legislation. While the Council
on Environmental Quality regulations allow a legislative EIS to be submit-
ted up to thirty days after legislation is submitted to Congress, they also
require that the EIS be available before the proposal is subject to congres-
sional hearings or consideration.1 3 9 To ensure that an EIS on a trade
agreement is available for congressional consideration, it must be submit-
ted along with the implementing legislation. Indeed, this is when the envi-
ronmental reviews on NAFTA and the Uruguay Round were released.
The USTR should have the first opportunity to develop workable pro-
cedures for preparing EISs on trade agreements. However, if it fails to do
so, or if its approach falls short of objective, balanced analysis and public
participation, Congress should intervene and devise appropriate
procedures.
5. The Trade Advisory Committee System Should Be More Open and Balanced.
The Trade Acts establish an extensive advisory committee system that gives
advisory committee members access to inside information about trade
negotiations and related matters and offers opportunities to participate in
the development of those trade policies. The most influential of these
committees, the Advisory Committee for Trade Policy and Negotiations
(ACTPN), is charged with providing advice on virtually all aspects of trade
negotiations and implementation of trade agreements and policies.' 40
More than three dozen other advisory committees have been established
to reflect various policies, such as services, investment, and defense; many
industrial sectors, including chemical products, tobacco, electronics,
energy, wood products, paper products, and nonferrous metals; and "func-
tions," which embrace intellectual property and customs.
These committees must be consulted and kept informed "on a contin-
uing and timely basis" about "significant issues and developments and
overall negotiating objectives and positions of the United States and other
137. For the Uruguay Round negotiations, this draft EIS could have been prepared
on the Dunkel draft, which was released to the public in December 1991. Any changes
to that text could then have been analyzed in the final EIS.
138. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b) (1993).
139. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.8 (1993).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a), (b) (1988).
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parties."141 In addition, the ACTPN and other committees whose subject
matters are affected by a trade agreement must prepare a report on the
trade agreement shortly after the conclusion of negotiations.' 42 This
guarantees members of the advisory committees immediate access to the
final trade agreement long before the agreement is generally available to
the public. In addition, the advice given by these committees must be
taken into account in determining the U.S. negotiating positions, and the
committees must be informed of any "significant departures from such
advice or recommendations." 43
Members of these committees have access to inside government infor-
mation about the overall negotiating objectives and bargaining positions
of the United States, even where such information is classified, contains
trade secrets, or is otherwise confidential.144 A 1989 Commerce Depart-
ment publication touting the benefits of serving on trade advisory commit-
tees during the negotiations leading to the 1979 Tokyo Round of GATr
agreements reported that members had access to a vast store of classified
documents concerning negotiations and a database that transmitted their
views directly to government negotiators. 45 With regard to the advisory
committees' influence, the publication claimed:
The advisory committee members spent long hours in Washington consult-
ing directly with negotiators on key issues and reviewing the actual texts of
proposed agreements. For the most part, government negotiators followed
the advice of the advisory committees .... [W]henever advice was not fol-
lowed, the government informed the committees of the reasons it was not
possible to utilize their recommendations.
146
More than 800 industry representatives serve on the advisory commit-
tees. Until recently, none had any representation of environmental or
consumer interests. Rather, they had been comprised almost entirely of
representatives of industry with a few representatives of labor organiza-
tions. Not only are these committees dominated overwhelmingly by indus-
try, but a significant number of the industry members have poor
environmental records and have worked to defeat strong environmental
regulations.' 47
In response to public and congressional objections at this skewed rep-
resentation, expressed during the 1991 debates over extending fast-track
authority, the USTR appointed representatives of environmental organiza-
tions to ACTPN and four other trade advisory committees in 1992. The
remaining committees, even those dealing with important environmental
and public health issues, such as those concerning chemicals, tobacco,
141. I § 2155(i).
142. Id. § 2155(e).
143. I& § 2155(a) (3), (i).
144. Id. § 2155(a)-(c), (g), (i).
145. Government Seeks Advice from Indusy on U.S. Trade Policy, Bus, AM.,Jan. 16, 1989,
at 8.
146. Id. at 9.
147. TOM HiLLARD, PUBLIC CrrIzEN, TRADE ADViSORY CoMMrrrEs: PRrLEGED Acczss
FOR POLLUTErRS (1991).
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fruits and vegetables, energy, wood products, and paper products, still lack
any environmental or consumer representation. In response to requests
for additional appointments of environmental and consumer representa-
tives to the trade advisory committees, 148 the USTR has taken the position
that no such representation is legally required, and for years it had refused
to make any additional appointments. 149 Recently, however, a consumer
representative and an environmental representative were appointed to the
ATPN. 150 In addition, President Clinton issued an Executive Order
establishing a trade and environment advisory committee as part of the
trade advisory committee network. Only some of the members of this
committee, however, represent environmental and consumer interests. 151
Virtually all of the meetings of the trade advisory committees are held
in closed session, and the USTR routinely withholds their records from
the public. Indeed, the U.S. Trade Representative recently directed that
all meetings to be held by twenty-one of the trade advisory committees will
be closed from March 1, 1994 to March 1, 1996. He did this by making a
determination that all such meetings will be concerned with matters that
would, if disclosed, seriously compromise the government's negotiating
objectives and bargaining positions. 152 This blanket determination runs
counter to longstanding open meeting principles requiring that agency
officials make closure determinations with respect to particular meetings
based on the agenda for the meeting, that only those portions of meetings
requiring secrecy may be closed, and that the public should receive notice
of closure determinations in order to have some way to challenge those
determinations administratively or in court.153
In addition, secrecy rules prevent trade advisory committee members,
including the few environmental representatives, from sharing any of the
information that they gain through their service on the committees, even
with their own staffs. Therefore, the trade advisory committees enable
more than 800 industry representatives and only a few specially chosen
environmental representatives to obtain more information about trade
negotiations and have far greater opportunities to provide input into
those negotiations than the general public.
148. Letter from Patti Goldman, Public Citizen, to the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative (Dec. 16, 1991) (on file with the Comel International LawJournal).
149. Letter fromJoshua Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to Public Citizen (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with the Corell International Law Journal).
150. The individuals are affiliated with Consumers Union and the Environmental
Defense Fund. The appointments were announced days after Consumers Union
announced its support for the Uruguay Round in a USTR press conference.
151. Exec. Order No. 12,905, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,733 (1994).
152. 59 Fed. Reg. 26,686 (1994).
153. Government-in-the-Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c), (e), (f) (1) (1988); Fed-
eral Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 10(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Public
Citizen and the Sierra Club have sued to compel the U.S. Trade Representative to
rescind this blanket closure order. Public Citizen v. Kantor, No. 94-2236 (D.D.C. filed
Oct. 17, 1994); see Letter from Patti Goldman, Public Citizen to Ambassador Michael
Kantor (June 1, 1994) (on file with the Corne!! International LawJournao.
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This system was devised before trade agreements injected themselves
into a whole array of domestic health and environmental matters, and
thus it is poorly suited to the types of problems now arising in the negotia-
tions. The trade advisory committees grant preferred access to a large
number of insiders at the expense of the interested public at large. Con-
gress and the USTR should rethink the entire trade advisory committee
system and consider replacing it with other mechanisms for expert and
public input.
If the trade advisory committee system is retained, however, several
reforms are in order to make it more balanced and open. First, all of the
advisory committees must have balanced representation of interests
including environmental and consumer interests affected by the trade
matters under consideration. The Bush Administration belatedly and par-
tially recognized the problem of unbalanced representation by appointing
a few environmental representatives to some of the trade advisory commit-
tees. However, it left dozens of advisory committees without any environ-
mental and consumer representation, including committees dealings with
such matters as the chemical industry, tobacco, energy, and wood prod-
ucts. This type of one-sided advisory body is contrary to the Federal Advi-
sory Committee Act (FACA) and rules of fair play. All trade advisory
committees must be balanced in terms of the views represented.
The environmental and consumer representatives on the trade advi-
sory committees should also present a balanced range of viewpoints. If,
for example, all the environmental representatives supported NAFTA, an
issue on which the environmental community was sharply divided, the
committees would likely violate FACA's balanced viewpoint require-
ment 5 4 and would, as a practical matter, lack the credibility and legiti-
macy that would enable them effectively to carry out their duties.' 5 5 The
trade and environment advisory committee should also not be viewed as
an excuse to maintain skewed memberships on other existing trade advi-
sory committees; those committees should still be required to include con-
sumer and environmental representation.
To achieve these goals, Congress should make it clear that all trade
advisory committees are fully subject to the balanced membership require-
ments of the Federal Advisory Committee Act.156 In order to provide
more explicit guidance to those appointing members to such committees,
Congress should go further and spell out the precise interests that must be
represented. The Trade Acts currently specify some interests that must be
represented, and the USTR has justified excluding consumer and environ-
mental representation where the statute does not explicitly require such
154. See Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 5(b) (2)-(3) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
155. The same imbalance is created if, as is currently the case, the sole consumer
representative on the trade advisory committees is affiliated with the only consumer (or
environmental) organization that is supporting the Uruguay Round.
156. 5 U.S.C. app. 2, § 5 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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representation. 157 Therefore, it is critical that Congress specify that envi-
ronmental and consumer representation is required on any advisory com-
mittee dealing with matters affecting the environment, health, or safety.
Under the Trade Acts, the ACTPN, the most powerful of the trade
advisory committees, "shall include representatives of non-Federal govern-
ments, labor, industry, agriculture, small business, service industries, retail-
ers, and consumer interests."158 The Trade Acts further require that the
ACTPN "shall be broadly representative of the key sectors and groups of
the economy, particularly with respect to those sectors and groups which
are affected by trade."159 These mandates should apply not only to the
ACTPN, but to all trade advisory committees.
The Trade Acts authorize the establishment of two other types of advi-
sory committees but do not mandate that certain interests be represented.
Lists of interests to be included on the committees are provided, but the
Acts require their inclusion only "insofar as practicable" and do not specif-
ically identify consumer or environmental interests. I '1 The USTR and the
Department of Commerce have construed this omission to permit skewed
trade advisory committees that exclude any environmental and consumer
representation. To ensure representation of these interests, Congress
should specifically identify them in the statute as ones that must (not "inso-
far as practicable") be represented on any trade advisory committee affect-
ing environmental, health, safety, or consumer matters.
Second, the Trade Acts currently except the trade advisory commit-
tees from certain openness requirements of the FACA. In particular, their
meetings are exempt from FACA's advance notice, openness, public par-
ticipation, and open records provisions "whenever and to the extent it is
determined by the President or his designee that such meetings will be
concerned with matters the disclosure of which would seriously compro-
mise the development by the United States Government of trade policy,
priorities, negotiating objectives or bargaining positions ..... 1 6 1 By invok-
ing this language, the USTR can close virtually all trade advisory commit-
tee meetings and refuse to make transcripts of those meetings available to
the public, even when they pertain to a trade agreement that has been
157. Letter fromJoshua Bolten, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative to Public Citizen (Feb. 3, 1992) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journa).
Even though the Trade Acts specifically require that consumer interests be represented
on the ACTPN, 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), no consumer representa-
tives sit on that committee.
The Uruguay Round implementing legislation amends the advisory committee por-
tion of the Trade Acts to specify that nongovernmental environmental and conserva-
tion organizations must be appointed to the ACTPN. Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
§ 128. However, this amendment leaves the other advisory committees without any
mandate to have environmental representation, which may permit the status quo to
persist and possibly worsen.
158. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(b) (1).
159. Id.
160. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(c) (1), (2).
161. 19 U.S.C. § 2155(0 (2).
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concluded.16 2
This authority should be repealed. The FACA itself incorporates the
exemptions to the open meeting requirements of the Government-in-the-
Sunshine Act,163 and the national security exemption protects foreign gov-
ernment information and other information that would, if released, harm
foreign relations. Likewise, the Freedom of Information Act'6 exempts
national security information from its mandate that the records of agen-
cies and, through the FACA, of advisory committees be made available to
the public. These exemptions provide ample authority to close those por-
tions of trade advisory committee meetings and to withhold those records
that must be kept secret to protect sensitive negotiating positions. They
do not, however, enable the government to cloak trade negotiations in
excessive secrecy that keep the public in the dark about non-sensitive mat-
ters. The largely discretionary and unconstrained authority given to trade
advisory committees to operate in secret should be repealed. 165
In sum, Congress and the USTR should conduct a public assessment
of the trade advisory committee system. The system gives a large number
of insiders preferred access and lessens the incentive to develop mecha-
nisms for obtaining input from the public at large. At a minimum, the
trade advisory committee system should be made more balanced and
open. Ultimately, however, it may be appropriate to replace the entire
system with other mechanisms for expert and public input.
B. The Implementation of Trade Agreements
Aside from establishing trade rules that domestic standards must meet,
recent trade agreements create two mechanisms for directly shaping
domestic standard-setting activities. First, they create incentives and a sys-
tem for harmonizing domestic standards. Second, they require countries
to permit imports of some goods that do not comply with domestic stan-
dards, where the goods satisfy different, but equivalent, standards.
Because both processes are becoming regular features of international
trade agreements, procedures should be established to ensure that they
are conducted in an open, accountable manner with public participation.
162. Letter from Laura B. Sherman, Office of General Counsel, Office of the U.S
Trade Representative to Public Citizen (Oct. 28, 1992) (on file with the Corne/! Interna-
t al Law Journal); see supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
163. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1988).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1988).
165. At some point, disclosures of trade secrets or confidential business information
to members of trade advisory committees may be so extensive that it amounts to indus-
try-wide access and the information can no longer be said to be confidential. In those
situations, further disclosures of the information would cause no competitive harm, but
would simply even the playing field between insiders and outsiders. Congress should
consider this issue expressly because a recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit may permit such extensively disclosed information to be withheld.
Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1579 (1993).
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1. Harmonization and U.S. Participation in International Standard-setting
Activities
Both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round would require countries to use
international standards as a basis for their own. Domestic standards that
conform to specified international ones are presumed to be consistent
with both trade agreements, while domestic standards that do not con-
form to them must satisfy a battery of GATT or NAFTA tests in order not to
be considered unfair trade barriers. 166
By subjecting domestic standards that provide greater public health
protection to a separate set of stringent requirements, these trade agree-
ments create strong incentives for the United States to avoid exceeding
international standards. Moreover, these provisions require domestic
decision-makers to begin with the relevant international standard and
allow deviations from it only if certain conditions set forth in the agree-
ment have been met.
As part of their promotion of international standards as the preferred
ones, NAFTA and the Uruguay Round require countries to participate in
international standard-setting activities. 16 7 However, neither agreement
establishes any openness or public participation requirements for such
standard-setting bodies.
The NAFTA and the Uruguay Round also establish processes for har-
monizing standards among the signatory countries.' 6 8 Representatives of
each country will participate in committees to develop harmonized stan-
dards, which will become the preferred standards as far as the trade agree-
ments are concerned.
The harmonization committees need not involve the public in their
proceedings. Thus, there is no open meeting requirement, no right of
access to their records and no requirement that the public be afforded an
opportunity to comment on proposed standards. In this respect, these
committees diverge sharply from domestic standard-setting processes in
Congress or in federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Yet the final result of this process is the presumptively correct domestic
standard.
Nor are states guaranteed a participatory role, even though they will
be pressured to adopt the harmonized standard as their own. Moreover, a
state standard that provides greater protection than the harmonized one
will be suspect and vulnerable to challenge as an unfair trade barrier. For
example, the Uruguay Round SPS and TBT Agreements prohibit domestic
standards that are more restrictive than necessary to achieve the measure's
objective. A recent GATT dispute panel concluded that a tax measure
imposed by only five states was not "necessary" because other states had
166. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 713(2), 905(1); SPS Agreement, supra note 1, paras. 9-
10; TBT Agreemen4 supra note 1, arts. 2.4, 5.4.
167. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 713(5); TBT Agreement, supra note 1, art. 5.5.
168. NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 722, 913; SPS Agreement; supra note 1, paras. 38-44;
TBT Agreement, supra note 1, art. 13.
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found "alternative, and possibly less trade restrictive, and GATT consis-
tent, ways of enforcing their tax laws."1 69 This rationale could be devastat-
ing if it were applied to the many health and environmental statutes that
permit, but do not require, states to provide greater health or environ-
mental protection than the federal government.'7 0 Nonetheless, despite
their strong interest in the harmonized standards, states are not included
in their development.
Not only do the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round fail to incorporate
any public participation procedures into the international standard-setting
activities mandated in those agreements, but the United States has no
existing procedures to ensure that its participation in such standard-set-
ting activities adheres to democratic principles. Thus, although the
United States has participated in the activities of the Codex Alimentarius
Commission for three decades, it has never adopted any procedures for
the public to participate in the development of the U.S. position on Codex
standards. Instead, the United States has modelled the development of
U.S. positions on the closed, industry-dominated Codex system, rather
than on open and participatory domestic standard-setting procedures.
The principal avenue for outside participation has been through an
advisory process established by the USDA and the FDA. The agencies have
solicited advice from a broad group of industry advisors on the formula-
tion of the U.S. position prior to Codex meetings. After providing the
industry representatives with the agenda for upcoming Codex meetings,
the draft U.S. position, and background materials, the agencies have con-
vened meetings to obtain their input. In addition, the U.S. delegations to
Codex meetings have included an array of industry representatives as non-
governmental advisors, representing every conceivable industry interest,
ranging from the general, e.g., chemical manufacturers and food proces-
sors, to the specific, e.g., chocolate manufacturers and spice, banana, and
peanut trade organizations. These industry representatives have been
privy to the Codex deliberations and have been consulted by the official
U.S. representatives throughout the process.
Prior to 1991, no consumer representatives were included in either
the pre-meeting consultations or the U.S. Codex delegations. In Decem-
ber 1991, Public Citizen demanded that USDA and FDA open up the
Codex advisory process and commit to making consumer representation a
169. United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, GATT, B.I.S.D.,
supra note 16, 39th Supp. 206, para. 5.52 (1993).
170. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a)
(1988). Stronger state regulations may also be in jeopardy under the Uruguay Round
requirement that a country must avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in its levels
of protection in different food safety situations. SPS Agreement supra note 1, para. 20.
Where a state is providing greater public health protection than the federal govern-
ment or than other states, the United States might be considered to be pursuing incon-
sistent levels of protection in violation of this requirement.
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permanent component of U.S. participation in Codex.171 In response,
FDA convened a meeting with consumer and environmental organiza-
tions, and FDA, USDA, and EPA held a public forum on Codex. 172
At the meeting, the agencies told the consumer and environmental
organizations how they could participate in the existing advisory process.
Thus, if an individual notifies the pertinent government official who coor-
dinates U.S. participation in a particular matter, he or she will receive
notices of Codex and U.S. advisory meetings, background material, and
draft U.S. positions. The individual may attend the U.S. advisory meetings
to discuss the U.S. position and may ask to be included as a nongovern-
mental advisor to the U.S. delegation to Codex meetings, although the
United States has made no commitment to provide funding for consumer
attendees.
The overture to include consumer and environmental organizations
in the existing advisory process has not significantly improved public par-
ticipation in U.S. Codex activities. 173 First, only those organizations that
were invited to the FDA meeting or attended the public forum know how
to be included in the process. No other individuals or organizations (and
perhaps none outside the Beltway) have received a comparable briefing
on how to become an insider in the process. A local activist or academic
working on a domestic issue that is being considered in Codex will still
have no way of knowing that Codex is considering the matter and that he
or she could have a role in shaping the U.S. position.
Second, the existing process caters to groups that have extensive
resources to devote to Codex matters on short notice. Representatives of
various industries have placed a high priority on monitoring and seeking
to influence Codex activities for some time, and they have both the
resources and the incentive to involve themselves in Codex matters. In
contrast, consumer groups are new to this forum and are not accustomed
to its methods of operation. Moreover, the resources of these organiza-
tions are often stretched to the limit in promoting their domestic agendas,
with little to spare for this obscure international body.
Codex has recognized that consumer participation needs to increase
if Codex standards are to have credibility and legitimacy. In 1991, the
171. Letter from Public Citizen to Secretary Edward Madigan, USDA, and Commis-
sioner David Kessler, FDA, (Dec. 16, 1991) (on file with the Cornell International Law
Journal).
172. Letter from Deputy Commissioners Carol R. Scheman & Michael R. Taylor,
FDA, to consumers (May 1, 1992) (on file with the Cornell International LawJournal); 57
Fed. Reg. 29,462 (1992); Letter from Alex B. Thiermann, U.S. Coordinator for Codex
Alimentarius to Patti A. Goldman, Public Citizen Litigation Group (June 19, 1992) (on
file with the Cornell International LawJourna).
173. Only one consumer representative attended the 1993 Codex meeting. Joint
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius: Report of the Twentieth
Session, 94-97 (1993). No consumer or environmental organizations were represented
at the 1991, 1992, or 1993 meetings of the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues
(CCPR), although a full range of industry interests were represented. Joint FAO/WHO
Food Standards Programme, Reports of the 23rd, 24th & 25th Sessions of the CCPR
(1991, 1992, 1993).
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Codex Commission endorsed a recommendation to improve consumer
participation in Codex. Specifically, the Commission recommended that
national governments: (1) stimulate consumer awareness of Codex
through the media, existing organizations, and other means, (2) establish
regular consultative procedures, such as a national Codex advisory com-
mittee, to ensure that consumers' views are given equal consideration in
the formulation of national positions to those of producers, industry, and
trade, and (3) support and fund the participation of consumer experts
and representatives in Codex proceedings. 174 Despite these recommenda-
tions, the United States still has not established a systematic way to ensure
balanced input into the development of Codex standards.
The International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) is another
international harmonization activity that offers industry insider status but
excludes consumer and public health organizations. ICH is co-sponsored
by regulatory agencies and pharmaceutical trade groups in the United
States, the European Union, andJapan to establish harmonized drug test-
ing and approval requirements. 175 Despite the significance of its activities
and the priority placed on them by FDA, no mechanism has been estab-
lished to ensure consumer participation in ICH activities.
In April 1993, FDA sought public comment on several ICH draft
guidelines and indicated that it was also considering whether to adopt the
final guidelines domestically.176 By this time, the ICH had been working
on developing the guidelines for two years, and the FDA had only one
remaining opportunity to comment on them. Despite the complexity of
the issues, and the voluminous record underlying the guidelines, the pub-
lic had only one month to submit comments. Not surprisingly, few outsid-
ers submitted comments.
Moreover, when FDA sought public comment on the ICH guidelines,
it indicated that it would decide, based on the comments received,
whether to adopt the guidelines as the pertinent U.S. standard. Indeed,
the FDA sought public comment for the first time on an ICH guideline on
clinical safety data management in connection with its decision whether to
adopt that guideline. 17 7 However, once the FDA has invested its resources
in developing the ICH standard, it will have a vested interest in that stan-
dard and may balk at objections that were not raised in the ICH proceed-
ings. As a result, the most opportune time for public input is during the
development of the harmonized standard and not when the United States
is deciding whether to adopt that standard as its own.
174. Report of the Nineteenth Codex Session, supra note 53.
175. Proceedings of the First International Conference on Harmonisation, Brussels,
1991, at xix (P. D'Arey & D. Harron eds., 1992) [hereinafter Proceedings]; Statement
by the ICH Steering Committee 1 1-2 (Tokyo October 1990), in Proceedings, supra, at
XXV.
176. 58 Fed. Reg. 21,074, 21,082, 21,086 (1993) (reproductive toxicity testing, geriat-
ric studies, and stability testing).
177. 58 Fed. Reg. 37,408 (1993).
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The Codex and ICH experiences demonstrate that the federal gov-
ernment should have uniform procedures for obtaining public input on
the development of international standards. The United States should
insist that international standard-setting bodies provide opportunities for
public oversight and input. At home, Congress should prescribe uniform
procedures for U.S. participation in international standard-setting
activities.
These procedures should be modelled on the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's requirements for notice-and-comment rule-making, the
requirements for public access to records under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, and the balance requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee
Act. They should also borrow generally from the scientific data require-
ments for agency decision-making. At a minimum, these procedures
should include the following recommendations.
a. Public information about international standard-setting activities
The federal government should periodically notify the public of all inter-
national standard-setting activities in which it is involved. For every inter-
national standard-setting body in which the United States participates, the
lead U.S. agency should notify the public of the body's mandate, how it
operates, and the people or offices that can supply further information.
These notifications should be placed in the Federal Register and other
widely distributed publications. The agencies should also take affirmative
steps to ensure that consumer, health, and environmental organizations
and interested academics receive information about these activities. 178
b. Public input in setting the agenda
The lead U.S. agency should solicit public input in identifying matters that
should and should not be included in the agenda of the international
standard-setting body. Once the international body has set its agenda, the
lead U.S. agency should publish that agenda to alert interested individuals
that the international body is addressing specific matters and to invite
interested individuals to submit relevant data.
c. Ensuring adequate databases for decisions
The lead agency should ensure that the standard-setting body (or the par-
ticular individual responsible for developing its proposals) has the most
complete data available to any federal or state agency on matters under
consideration. International standard-setting organizations often lack the
power to compel industry to submit data, in contrast to domestic agencies.
178. The GATr implementing legislation requires the Secretary of Commerce to
make available to the public information regarding the membership of the federal,
state, and local governments in international and regional standard-setting bodies.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 431 (a). It also requires responsible agencies to pub-
lish annually a notice in the Federal Register of the sanitary and phytosanitary standards
under consideration or planned for consideration by international standard-setting
organizations. Id. § 432.
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In Codex, for example, an individual assigned to draft the Codex proposal
relies on data available to him or her, but there has been no mechanism to
ensure that the data set is the most complete available to Codex members.
As a result, Codex standards have been criticized as being based on incom-
plete and inadequate data.
d. Notice and comment on draft standards
Whenever the standard-setting body distributes a proposal to the U.S. par-
ticipants, that proposal should be made available to the public for com-
ment. Early availability is critical because it is far more difficult to affect
the decision-making process after significant deliberations have taken
place. The U.S. participant should then consider the comments and
explain publicly its rationale for accepting or rejecting them. If there are
any substantial changes in the proposal, the U.S. participant should seek
another round of comment on the redrafted proposal and consider fur-
ther comments in developing its position. 179
e. Publication of final standards and U.S. positions
When an international body adopts its final position, the U.S. participant
should publish that position in the Federal Register, along with the U.S.
response. If the United States must decide whether to give an interna-
tional standard domestic effect or to permit imports that comply with it,
the United States should make that decision through notice-and-comment
rule-making. For example, the United States must decide what status to
give Codex standards domestically (acceptance, free passage or nonaccept-
ance). The results of that process should be made easily accessible to the
public through publication in the Federal Register and the Code of Federal
Regulations.
All standards adopted by international standard-setting bodies should
be indexed and made affirmatively available to the public in accordance
with the FOIA's affirmative disclosure provisions.' 80 Currently, Codex
standards and the U.S. position with respect to them are not easily accessi-
ble to the public in the United States. The lead agency should prepare an
index of all such standards and ensure that they are easily accessible elec-
tronically or through depository libraries.
E State and local government participation
Where an international standard concerns a matter within existing state or
local regulatory authority, the state or local governments should be
included in the development of the U.S. position. The states should have
the authority to select their representatives if it is not feasible to consult
with all affected states.
179. The GATT implementing legislation requires responsible agencies to provide
the public with an opportunity to comment on such standards and to take such com-
ments into account when considering and proposing matters for consideration by such
organizations. Id. § 432.
180. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1988).
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g. Advisory committees
In order to ensure a more open, inclusive process of developing the U.S.
positions, agencies may wish to establish advisory committees with signifi-
cant environmental and consumer representation. This would facilitate
the development of ongoing relationships with interested groups and
increase their knowledge and ability to be meaningful advisors.
h. Funding consumer and environmental involvement
The lead agency should also provide the funding needed to enable envi-
ronmental, health, and safety experts and nongovernmental bodies to par-
ticipate fully in international standard-setting activities. The organizations
able to present environmental and consumer perspectives generally have
resource limitations that prevent them from monitoring and attending
meetings in other countries. As a matter of practice, the European Union
funds nongovernmental participation in its proceedings. Such funding
has been provided on a case-by-case basis by the U.S. government to public
interest organizations participating in Codex proceedings. In contrast,
industry representatives have the resources to participate in bodies such as
Codex and are even co-sponsors of the ICH. It may be feasible to require
industry participants to pay a stipend to help fund nongovernmental
organization participation. In any event, environmental and consumer
representation will improve only once there are sufficient resources to
support their participation.
i. Balance in U.S. advisors
The United States should ensure that its advisors are balanced in terms of
the perspectives and interests represented both in establishing its position
and in participating at international standard-setting meetings.
2. Equivalence Determinations
In order to liberalize trade in goods, the most recent trade agreements
(NAFTA and the Uruguay Round TBT and SPS Agreements) require
countries to permit imports of some goods that do not satisfy their own
standards if the goods meet different, but equivalent, standards. 181 Similar
requirements apply to conformity assessment procedures, which are
inspection, certification, and approval processes to determine whether
goods conform to domestic standards.' 8 2
The concept of "equivalence" has led to controversy under the U.S.-
Canada Free Trade Agreement (USCFTA) in the area of meat and milk
inspection. Prior to the USCFTA, USDA conducted random inspections
of meat imported to the United States from Canada. Under the USCFTA,
USDA conducted an equivalence study and determined that the Canadian
181. NAFMA, supra note 1, arts. 714(2), 906(4); SPSAgreemeng supra note 1, para. 14;
TBTAgreement supra note 1, art. 2.7.
182. NAFMA, supra note 1, art. 906(6).
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meat inspection procedures were equivalent to U.S. ones. l8 3
The General Accounting Office has criticized this equivalence deter-
mination for overlooking important considerations and for reaching cer-
tain conclusions without outside review. The equivalence study did not
assess the Canadian system's control of, or testing for, drugs approved for
use in Canada but not in the United States.18 4 In addition, the study
made professional judgments about the scientific and health implications
of differences in the two systems, such as the U.S. testing of end products
for listeria contamination, in contrast to the Canadian testing of workers
and the work environment in which the food is processed.' 8 5 These pro-
fessional assessments were not peer reviewed.'
8 6
Pursuant to its equivalence determination, USDA ceased inspecting
all Canadian meat imports in 1989. Instead, it instituted a cursory rein-
spection system designed not to ensure that the meat imports met U.S.
standards, but rather to ensure that Canada maintained its equivalent
inspection system.' 87 Only certain shipments were inspected; USDA
would give Canadian plants advance notice when a shipment was selected
for inspection and allow Canadian inspectors to select the samples to be
inspected.' 8 8
The General Accounting Office criticized the relaxed border inspec-
tions, contending that USDA documentation did not support the conclu-
sion that the Canadian meat inspection was equivalent to the U.S.
system.' 8 9 Meat inspectors complained that Canadian producers were tak-
ing advantage of the cursory reinspections and shipping contaminated
meat.190 Under this system, the rejection rate for Canadian imports
dropped by half, even though the Canadian rejection rate for U.S. meat
doubled over the same time period.19 '
The Canadian meat inspection example illustrates the controversial
public health issues that underlie equivalence determinations. Nonethe-
less, NAFTA, like the USCFTA and the Uruguay Round of GATr, entitles
countries to such a determination without requiring the assessment of
every potentially significant public health issue or every inspection pro-
cess. Applying the concept of equivalence to performance standards and
good manufacturing practice requirements will present an array of diffi-
183. U.S. GENERAL AccoUNTNGr OFFIcE, FOOD SAFETY AND QUAT. USDA IMPROVES
INSPECTION PROGRAM FOR CANADIAN MEAT, BUT SOME CONCERNS REMAIN 1-2, 4, 14
(1992) [hereinafter FooD SAFEry AND QuALm"n REPORT].
184. Id. at 3, 6, 20.
185. Id. at 5, 18.
186. Id. at 2, 7.
187. Id at 1.
188. Id. at 2.
189. Id.
190. Affidavit of WilliamJ. Lehman, Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative, 970 F.2d 916 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (on file with the Comell Interntionat Law
Journa).
191. FOOD SAIm=v Am QuALFw REPoRT, supra note 183, at 3, 25.
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cult problems, similar to those presented by the different regulatory
approaches to the detection of listeria contamination.
The concept of equivalence also fueled a formal trade challenge
under the USCFTA to Puerto Rico's restrictions of Canadian exports of
ultra-high temperature milk. In 1990, responding to FDA pressure,
Puerto Rico adopted the standards and inspection procedures that are in
place throughout the rest of the United States. This milk inspection sys-
tem is preventive in nature, designed to ensure milk industry compliance
with safe sanitation standards and practices. It relies heavily on inspec-
tions and certifications by state and local agencies. The Canadian UHT
milk did not comply with the Puerto Rican standards, and neither Canada
nor Quebec had joined the inspection and certification system used by
Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States.
Although the Puerto Rican authorities were involved at the outset, the
FDA soon took the lead role in trying to work out a solution. It urged
Quebec to participate in the inspection system, in which case the FDA
would certify its rating officers, but, because of the large expense involved,
it agreed to do so only if Canada would participate fully in the system. As
an alternative, the FDA suggested that Quebec contract with a northern
state (such as Vermont) to have its authorized inspectors, laboratory offi-
cials, and rating officers carry out the required inspections and ratings.
Canada rejected these options and argued that its standards were substan-
tially equivalent, and thus its milk had to be accepted. In response,
imports of Canadian UHT milk were barred at the end of 1991.
Canada demanded an equivalence study, but the two countries could
not agree on the parameters of the study. In September of 1992, Canada
requested establishment of a dispute settlement panel. The USTR then
indicated that it would be too costly to conduct an equivalence study and
participate in the dispute settlement process at the same time.
The panel convened under the USCFTA concluded that the United
States had nullified and impaired Canada's expectations under the
USCFTA by closing the Puerto Rican market to UHT milk during the
course of negotiations on equivalence, and it recommended the expedi-
tious completion of an equivalence study.1 9 2 The FDA is now conducting
the equivalence study, but the study is quite costly and has required the
FDA to divert funds from its other statutorily-mandated public health
missions.
This dispute highlights the expense and commitment of resources
involved in equivalence determinations from a domestic perspective and
the absolute right to such a determination on an expeditious basis from a
trade perspective. The confusion among the U.S. actors at the federal and
state levels and in the USTR and FDA were partly responsible for the chal-
lenge. In order to avoid future confusion over the respective roles of fed-
eral and state agencies and to include the public in equivalence
192. Puerto Rico Regulations Report, supra note 31, paras. 5.60-.61.
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determinations, the United States should establish a uniform, open, and
participatory process for making such determinations.
Before turning to what that process should entail, one other recent
equivalence experience warrants mention because it illustrates the effect
that such a determination may have on state laws. After the Department
of Transportation decided in 1991 to grant reciprocal status to Mexican
commercial drivers' licenses, it concluded that the Mexican standards
were compatible with U.S. standards. It thus required states to recognize
Mexican commercial drivers' licenses and preempted them from requir-
ing Mexican drivers to obtain state commercial drivers' licenses. More-
over, the Department made clear that noncomplying states could lose
federal highway funds. 193
In July of 1992, the California legislature passed a resolution directing
the California Department of Motor Vehicles to continue enforcing Cali-
fornia requirements for commercial drivers. 19 4 Nonetheless, when the
Federal Highway Administration threatened to withhold federal highway
funds, the California Department of Highway Patrol decided to recognize
Mexican commercial drivers' licenses.'
9 5
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters challenged the Depart-
ment of Transportation's recognition of Mexican commercial drivers'
licenses, contending (among other things) that the Department had failed
to follow the notice-and-comment rule-making requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in making its equivalence determina-
tion. 196 The Department had announced that it had granted Mexican
commercial drivers' licenses reciprocity without affording the public an
opportunity to comment on whether the Mexican standards are, in fact,
compatible with U.S. safety standards.
The Teamsters contended that Mexican commercial drivers' licenses
are not equivalent to U.S. licenses because there is no assurance that Mexi-
can drivers have sufficient knowledge of the English language to under-
stand highway signs, respond to official inquiries, and file reports, which
are critical for safeguarding hazardous materials. Nor are there compara-
ble Mexican requirements for sufficient knowledge to operate equipment
safely or for special authorization to operate double or triple trailers, pas-
senger vehicles, tank vehicles, hazardous materials vehicles, or air brake-
equipped vehicles. The Teamsters also complained that the reciprocity
agreement did not require an adequate exchange of information to per-
193. 57 Fed. Reg. 31,454 (1992).
194. Cal. Con. Res. 128, ch.70 (1992). The resolution highlighted concerns that
Mexican licenses last 10 years as opposed to four-year California licenses, are based on
different medical requirements, and do not require special certificates for driving
double trailers, tank trucks, buses, or hazardous materials. It also stressed that there
was no evidence that Mexico applies similar sanctions, such as barring drivers convicted
of second drunk driving offenses from driving commercial vehicles, and that there was
an inadequate communication link to check traffic offenses and license revocations.
195. California Highway Patrol Letter, supra note 80.
196. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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mit identification of disqualified Mexican drivers. 19 7
The Department contended that it had complied with the APA by
allowing the public to comment on the general issue of pursuing reciproc-
ity and pointed out that it had received comments from the Teamsters and
others indicating that reciprocity would be acceptable if the other coun-
try's licenses met U.S. safety standards. In the Department of Transporta-
tion's view, however, no public comment was required on the question of
whether Mexican commercial drivers' license requirements are, in fact,
equivalent to U.S. requirements, including those pertaining to safety.1 98
In March of 1994, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
rejected the Teamsters' challenge. The court held that recognition of
Mexican drivers' licenses was exempt from notice and comment rule-mak-
ing either because it fell within the foreign affairs rule-making exception
or because the international reciprocity agreement resolved the issue, and
therefore the Department had no remaining discretion to exercise
through rule-making.' 9 9
The rationale of the D.C. Circuit decision could eliminate open and
participatory processes for domestic health, safety, and environmental reg-
ulations where an international agreement or development resolves the
issue. Yet none of the trade agreements with equivalence provisions-the
U.S.-Canada FTA, NAFTA, and the Uruguay Round SPS and TBT Agree-
ments-have any alternative procedures for ensuring a public role in
equivalence determinations. Given the controversial and inherently sub-
jective nature of equivalence determinations, public scrutiny and input is
essential.
The United States should adhere to notice-and-comment rule-making
requirements when making equivalence determinations. However, due to
the unique nature of these requests for waivers of applicable laws and reg-
ulations, Congress should prescribe a process for making equivalence
determinations that establishes both procedural and substantive
safeguards.
a. All procedural and substantive requirements must be met or
exceeded
Substantively, the rules should require that every potentially significant
public health issue and every inspection process must be assessed in the
equivalence determination, and they should ensure that the other coun-
try's standard meets or exceeds the goal of each procedural or substantive
requirement of the standard.
The Canadian meat inspection equivalence determination did not
assess whether the Canadian system tested for drugs that were approved in
Canada but not in the United States. It turned out that neither the Cana-
197. Brief of Petitioners, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena., 17 F.3d
1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
198. Brief of Respondents, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena., 17 F.3d
1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (on file with the Cornell International Law Journal).
199. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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dian inspectors nor the cursory U.S. border inspections tested for several
drugs used in Canada. When the federal government preempted state
commercial drivers' license requirements pursuant to its Memorandum of
Understanding with Mexico, controversy arose over whether Mexico had
adequate safety requirements, for example, to ensure the safe transport of
hazardous materials. These examples show that it is imperative that each
equivalence determination address every facet of the U.S. standard and
the protection that it affords.
b. Environmental and public health protection must never be reduced
Another substantive limitation should be imposed on equivalence deter-
minations: they should never lead to a reduction in the level of protection
provided to the public, nor should they lead to less effective means of
implementing or enforcing a level of protection or other goal.
The NAFTA implementing legislation replaced a standard that
required imports to comply with requirements "at least equal to" our
domestic standards. That language construes "equivalence" to ensure that
it does not weaken the public health protection afforded in the United
States. Although the NAFTA-implementing legislation abandoned this
standard, the American public would probably not endorse the unfettered
discretion offered in its place. Congress should adopt the now repealed
"at least equal to" standard as the U.S. standard for equivalence.
Procedurally, the process should ensure that equivalence determina-
tions are made on the basis of a public record and that there are opportu-
nities for public input and peer review.
c. The agency responsible for the domestic standard must make the
equivalence determination
The agency with responsibility for developing, implementing, or enforcing
the domestic standard should be the entity responsible for making an
equivalence determination. That agency has the best understanding of
the scientific and policy underpinnings of the existing standard and of the
health, safety, and environmental consequences of deviating in particular
ways from the existing standard. For this reason, it should conduct the
review and make the determination.
However, facilitating trade in goods that do not comply with domestic
standards is not within the domestic mandate of most health, safety, and
environmental agencies. Since equivalence determinations can be
resource-intensive, they may detract from an agency's ability to promote its
domestic public health, safety, or environmental agenda. While the sub-
stantive agencies should be responsible for making the equivalence deter-
mination, the funds for this task should come from the budgets of
agencies charged with promoting international trade.
d. Public, on-the-record decision-making
The process should require that equivalence requests be made public and
that they lead to the creation of an official docket on the matter. The
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other country's justification for treating its standard as equivalent to our
own must also be made public. The United States should refuse to enter-
tain requests if the other country refuses to release both the request and
its justification. The final determination should be open to the public and
should be placed in the official docket.
e. Public participation
Upon receipt of a request for an equivalence determination, the lead
agency should publish the request in the Federal Register and solicit pub-
lic comments. It should take those comments into account in making its
determination because it is promulgating the equivalent of a rule. The
final equivalence determination should respond to all public comments
and any peer review. 200
f. Peer or other outside review
Equivalence determinations should be subjected to extensive peer review
when issues arise concerning scientific, health, safety, or policy issues on
which there is any substantial difference of opinion.
In assessing the equivalence of the Canadian meat inspection system,
the USDA concluded that the Canadian goods manufacturing practice
regulations were equivalent to U.S. testing of end products for listeria con-
tamination. However, the General Accounting Office took the position
that the scientific and health implications of these two approaches are
controversial and should be reviewed by a neutral body of experts.20 1
g. The result of an equivalence determination
The equivalence determination should spell out precisely which require-
ments are waived for particular imports and prescribe a system of rigid
monitoring to ensure that the equivalence determination continues to be
valid. Public annual reports should describe the products that have been
imported under the equivalence determination and the results of the
ongoing monitoring. The reports should also disclose the costs of making
and monitoring equivalence determinations to enable the public to assess
the resources devoted to this endeavor. The equivalence determination
should be redone periodically, but in no event should it be done less often
than every five years.
C. U.S. Participation in Dispute Settlement Proceedings Under Trade
Agreements
Trade agreements provide a mechanism for countries to bring trade chal-
lenges against measures of other countries that are allegedly in violation of
200. The GATT implementing legislation requires the FDA to follow notice and com-
ment procedures in making equivalence determinations. Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, § 432. It is unclear why the FDA is made subject to this requirement but not the
USDA, which has been involved in the most controversial equivalence determination
thus far.
201. Food SAFETY AND QuAurrY REPORT, supra note 183, at 2, 5, 7, 18.
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the trade agreement. These challenges are resolved by trade experts in
secret, based on information supplied by governments without input from
other entities. Trade dispute settlement bodies have rarely obtained input
from outside experts even when they have had the authority to do so. If a
trade panel finds that a measure violates a trade agreement, or otherwise
impairs an expected benefit from the agreement, it typically directs the
losing country to remove the offending measure, even if that requires a
change in domestic law. The enforcement mechanisms have been greatly
enhanced in the most recent trade agreements, which contain automatic
authorization for the winning country to impose trade sanctions if the los-
ing country does not comply with the panel ruling within a specified (rela-
tively short) period of time.20 2
In recent years, trade challenges have been mounted to domestic
health and environmental measures that had previously been thought to
be the province of domestic law. Thus, laws and regulations designed to
reduce tobacco use, to promote fuel economy, to inspect milk production
for health reasons, to ban tuna imports to protect dolphins, to institute
effective recycling programs, and to tax chemicals to fund the cleanup of
toxic waste sites have been challenged as trade barriers.2 03 Several chal-
lenges have not been finally resolved, but others have been, thereby facili-
tating more cigarette exports to, and consumption in, several Asian
countries, the invalidation of a reusable bottle component of Denmark's
recycling program, and a U.S. regulation permitting residues of a sus-
pected carcinogenic pesticide in imported wine.20 4
Because international trade disputes are considered sensitive interna-
tional negotiations rather than formal adjudications, they are conducted
in a closed environment. The secrecy and lack of public participation per-
sists even though the proceedings have evolved into quasi-adjudicatory
proceedings that rely on past decisions as precedent and establish rules to
govern future matters.
The United States must work to open the international proceedings
to public scrutiny, and to provide avenues for participation by affected
interests in those proceedings. In addition, trade disputes calling for a
decision as to whether certain health or environmental protections are
impermissible trade barriers should not be made by trade panels, but
instead should be resolved by a neutral forum. The United States should
work to remove such disputes from the auspices of trade panels.
Such reforms of the international trade dispute settlement system, by
necessity, may not be accomplished by the United States alone. However,
202. NAFrA, supra note 1, art. 2019; Dispute Settlement supra note 35, § 22.
203. See, e.g., United States-Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances, GATT,
B.I.S.D., supra note 16, 34th Supp. 137 (1988).
204. Case 302/86, Re Disposable Beer Cans: E.C. Commission v. Denmark, 1988
E.C.RL 4607, 1 C.M.L.1R 619 (1988); Morton Mintz, Tobacco Roads: DeliveringDeath to the
Third World, PROGRESSrvE, May 1991, at 26, 28-29; Council on Scientific Affairs, The
Worldwide Smoking Epidemic: Tobacco Trade, Use & ControJAMAJune 27, 1990, at 3315-
18 (1990); Gregory N. Connolly et al., The International Marketing of Tobacco, inToACco
USE IN AMERICA CONFERENCE 49, 51-52 (1989).
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the United States can take immediate steps to ensure that its own partici-
pation in such proceedings is more open, participatory, and accountable.
1. The United States Should Select Panel Members with Expertise in
Environmental and Consumer Matters
One place to start is with the selection of individuals to serve on interna-
tional dispute settlement panels. An inherent bias is built into the dispute
settlement system because the panels are composed of trade specialists
and not individuals with more broad-based, diverse expertise. To counter
this bias, the United States should ensure that candidates on the dispute
settlement rosters and individuals selected to serve on particular panels
have broader expertise and experience in environmental and consumer
matters when a dispute implicates such matters. Section 106(b) of the
NAFTA Implementation Act requires the United States to seek to ensure
that panels dealing with environmental issues have environmental exper-
tise. That principle should be expanded beyond environmental issues to
other consumer, health, and safety issues, and beyond NAFIA to all inter-
national trade dispute settlement bodies.
As a related matter, there is currently no rule prohibiting an individ-
ual with a stake in the development of certain trade rules from serving on
a panel. The only limitations concern the nationalities of the panelists.
Recently, charges have been made that two members of a five-member
panel hearing a softwood lumber dispute between the United States and
Canada had failed to disclose that their law firms are or were representing
the Canadian government and Canadian lumber interests. 20 5 The United
States should develop pervasive ethics and conflict of interest rules for
trade panelists and a mechanism to ensure compliance with them. For
example, candidates for inclusion on dispute settlement panel rosters
should be required to complete financial disclosure forms and to abide by
conflict of interest requirements analogous to those in the Ethics in Gov-
erment Act. In addition, special conflict of interest rules should be
developed for this purpose. The United States should establish such
requirements for its nominees to international trade panels, and it should
encourage other countries to do the same. 206
2. The Department ofJustice Should Represent the United States in Trade
Dispute Settlement Proceedings
Traditionally, the USTR has represented the United States in trade dis-
pute settlement proceedings. At the same time, the USTR is the chief
negotiator for the United States in international trade matters, and it is
also the agency investigating trade practices of other countries and impos-
ing retaliatory sanctions for trade barriers. Because the USTR is often a
205. Canada Unlikely to Yield to U.S. an Lumber Dispute Pane4j. COMM., Feb. 18,1994, at
1A, 8A.
206. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation requires the USTR to "seek" the
establishment of conflict of interest rules for dispute settlement panelists. Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, § 123(c).
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partisan player in the very trade matters that are the subject of trade chal-
lenges, it may have a tendency to bargain away one matter that is being
challenged in return for an unrelated trade concession. That type of
horse trading is anathema to the way that the federal government con-
ducts domestic litigation.
It would be more appropriate for the Department ofJustice to repre-
sent the United States before trade dispute settlement panels. Justice
Department lawyers would, in essence, represent the USTR as the client
agency. Where the matter at issue falls within the jurisdiction of another
agency, that agency would be the client agency. For example, the Depart-
ment of Transportation and the EPA would have been the client agencies
in the European Union's challenge to the U.S. fuel economy penalties and
gas guzzler tax. If there is a conflict between the USTR's trade goals and
the other agency's objectives, the Department ofJustice would resolve that
conflict and establish the U.S. position, as it does in domestic litigation.
The Justice Department should be obligated to give due consideration to
the views of all interested agencies and to any state with an interest in the
challenged matter.
3. Dispute Settlement Records Must Be Easily Accessible to the Public
Trade disputes are shrouded in secrecy. The USTR has transplanted this
secrecy from Geneva to its own offices. It has been virtually impossible to
obtain timely access to submissions to trade panels and panel decisions.
Even though nothing in the text of the GATT mandated secrecy of
these matters, until recently the United States had a practice of refusing to
make public its submissions to GAT panels until after the GATT Council
adopted the panel's report.20 7 In the first Tuna Dolphin Case, this secrecy
prevented the public from scrutinizing the U.S. position until after the
culmination of the proceeding. Of course, the public had no ability to
shape the U.S. position without earlier access. Alternatively, if the public
had been able to review the initial submission when it was filed, it could
have provided suggestions for the U.S. rebuttal submission.
Similarly, the U.S. Trade Representative has routinely refused to
release GAIT panel decisions until after the GATT Council has adopted
them. This has enabled the USTR to place its gloss on the decision before
the public and the media can evaluate it for themselves. For example,
when the press reported the outcome of the first Tuna Dolphin challenge,
the USTR commented publicly and briefed interest groups. However, the
public was not able to review the decision until Inside U.S. Trade printed it
several weeks later. By that time, the media had already covered the mat-
ter based on second-hand reports from those with a stake in the dispute.
In a lawsuit to compel the USTR to provide contemporaneous access
to U.S. submissions and panel decisions, a federal district court declared
207. The GATT Council is comprised of all GATT contracting parties, and it may, by
consensus, adopt panel reports, making them binding on the parties to the dispute and
converting the decision into a legal interpretation of the GATr's meaning.
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that the USTR has no legal basis for withholding its submissions from the
public until a GATT panel decision has been issued and adopted by the
GATT Council. 208 The court also declared illegal the policy of delaying
public access to GATT panel decisions until after they are adopted by the
GATr Council. 20 9 The USTR did not appeal this decision. Accordingly,
U.S. submissions to GATr panels should be publicly available once they
are submitted to the panel, and future GATT decisions should be available
to the public as soon as the United States receives them. In practice, how-
ever, it has still been difficult to obtain timely access to U.S. submissions
and to panel decisions.2 10 Thus, long after the FOIA decision, several
individuals have still been unable to obtain copies of U.S. submissions in
recent high-profile disputes, despite making repeated requests for them to
the USTR.2 11 In the face of these obstacles, the only way to obtain access
to U.S. submissions is to file Freedom of Information Act requests and wait
many months for a response. This approach creates unnecessary adminis-
trative burdens for both the USTR and the public.2 12
The USTR has not catalogued or otherwise organized its dispute set-
tlement records in a systematic manner that facilitates public access. In
fact, the USTR has no system for ensuring that U.S. submissions and
records documenting the resolution of past disputes are retained by the
USTR after the attorney handling the case has left his or her position. As
a result, the USTR cannot locate some past U.S. submissions and other
records documenting the resolution of some disputes, and it often takes
months for it to locate others. Although some recent submissions are
available in the USTR reading room, that room is locked and accessible to
the public only by appointment with an employee who is often unavaila-
208. Public Citizen v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 804 F. Supp. 385, 387
(D.D.C. 1992).
209. Id. at 388.
210. Discussion with Jeremy Madsen, Public Citizen (March 1994) (dispute panel
reports under the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement).
211. E.g., Discussion with Steve Charnovitz, Staff Director, Competitiveness Policy
Council (May 4, 1994) (submissions in European Union's challenge to intermediary
tuna-dolphin embargo); discussion with Professor Kirsten Engel, Tulane University Law
School (April 1994) (submissions in European Union's challenge to fuel economy pen-
alties and gas guzzler tax).
212. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation mandates that the USTR make
the U.S. submissions available to the public promptly after they are submitted to a
GATT panel. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 127(c). This affirmative disclosure
obligation may force the USTR to comply with the district court decision. However, the
implementing legislation permits the USTR to withhold information contained in the
U.S. submission that another country treats as confidential. Id. The process of
redacting such information itself delays public access. Moreover, the Center for Auto
Safety and Public Citizen have filed a lawsuit seeking access under the Freedom of
Information Act to the European Union's submissions to the GATT panels considering
the challenges to the U.S. intermediary tuna-dolphin embargo and to the U.S. gas guz-
zler tax and fuel economy penalties. Center for Auto Safety v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, No. 94-2238 (D.D.C. Oct. 18, 1994). If the plaintiffs succeed in that
lawsuit, it would make no sense for the USTR to redact reference to the submissions
from the U.S. submissions.
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ble, making it cumbersome and inconvenient to obtain timely access. 2 13
In order to ensure that dispute settlement records are preserved and
easily accessible to the public, the USTR should adopt procedures for
organizing and maintaining such records. Thus, the USTR should require
that an official docket be maintained for every dispute settlement proceed-
ing in which the U.S. participates.2 1 4 If some documents are not available
to the public, a separate docket of the publicly available records could be
maintained.
All submissions should be included in the appropriate docket as soon
as they are filed. All panel decisions and other actions should be included
in the public docket as soon as they are received by the United States. Any
records disclosing any adoption of, or other action taken with respect to,
the panel reports should immediately be made available to the public and
included in the public docket.
The docket should be available at a location that is easily accessible to
the public without pre-arranged appointments or other obstacles. More-
over, the official dockets should be preserved in an easily accessible loca-
tion for historical purposes.
Congress should mandate that the USTR prepare a public report
detailing the actions that it is taking to make both its participation in inter-
national trade disputes and the international trade dispute resolution
processes more open. This report should specifically direct the USTR to
spell out the efforts that it is taking to implement the district court deci-
sion on U.S. submissions and GATT panel reports and to adopt compara-
ble procedures for disputes arising under other trade agreements. If the
USTR does not establish procedures for making dispute settlement materi-
als easily accessible to the public, Congress should mandate such
procedures.
4. The United States Should Ensure that the Public has an Opportunity to
Participate in the Development of the U.S. Position in Trade Dispute
Settlement Proceedings2 15
Once a dispute leads to a request for the establishment of a dispute settle-
ment panel, the attorneys representing the United States should publish a
notice in the Federal Register identifying the countries involved in the dis-
pute, the challenged measures, the basis for the challenge, any domestic
measures that are affected directly or indirectly by the dispute, the person
to contact for further information, and the location of the official docket.
213. Discussion with Jeremy Madsen, Public Citizen (Mar. 1994).
214. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation requires the USTR to establish a
public file for each dispute settlement proceeding in which the United States is a party.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 127(e). However, the file need not contain the
other countries' submissions. See supra note 212.
215. President Clinton recently issued Executive Order 12,915, Federal
Implementation of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(May 13, 1994), which directs the EPA to provide appropriate mechanisms for receiving
public comment with respect to arbitral proceedings and Commission activities
involving the United States. 59 Fed. Reg. 25,775, 25,776 (1994).
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The agency should also publish in the Federal Register the schedule for sub-
missions to, and arguments before, the panel. The USTR has begun to
publish a notice in the Federal Register at the outset of dispute panel pro-
ceedings. However, the notice tends to be cursory and is not followed up
with other notices concerning the schedule. 216
Where a U.S. measure is challenged, the Department of Justice
should publish in the Federal Register a summary of the arguments made in
the other country or countries' submissions and should solicit public com-
ment and information to assist the United States in developing its submis-
sions. This will enable the United States to obtain expert input from
interested parties in an open way rather than by soliciting such input
behind closed doors from only some of the affected interests as is cur-
rently done. Where the issue is particularly controversial or otherwise sig-
nificant, the government should convene a public meeting to discuss the
issues.
The United States should, as a matter of practice, routinely ask the
other parties to a dispute to make their submissions available to the pub-
lic. It is exceedingly difficult for interested individuals to assist the United
States in responding to a challenge without access to the basis for that
challenge. If the United States reveals some elements of the other dispu-
tants' arguments in its submission, it should insist that the other countries
agree to waive confidentiality at least with respect to those portions of
their submissions, even if they insist on keeping their own submissions
secret. Currently, the USTR redacts those portions of its submission that
reveal precise arguments made by the other disputants. It is often difficult
to grasp the full thrust of the U.S. submission because of these
redactions. 21 7
The United States should permit outside interests to submit informa-
tive material to be attached to the U.S. submission, subject to reasonable
rules to guard against duplication and frivolous submissions. When Public
Citizen and the Center for Auto Safety prepared an amicus curiae brief
defending the U.S. fuel economy penalties and gas guzzler tax and asked
the USTR to attach that brief to the U.S. submission, the USTR refused to
do so and never provided an explanation for its refusal. Amicus briefs
attached to the U.S. submission would give outsiders the means to submit
information to a dispute panel. It would also demonstrate to the panels
216. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation requires the USTR to publish a
notice in the Federal Register describing a dispute settlement proceeding, to seek public
comment, and to take such comments into consideration in preparing the U.S. submis-
sions. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, § 127(b). It is important that this notice suffi-
ciently inform the public about the nature of the dispute, so that meaningful comments
and useful information can be supplied.
217. The Uruguay Round implementing legislation requires the USTR to request
that the other countries involved in disputes in which the United States is a party make
their submissions available to the public. Id. § 127(c) (2). Where the countries refuse,
and in other disputes not involving the United States, the USTR must ask the other
countries to prepare nonconfidential summaries of their submissions, which the USTR
must then make available to the public. Id. § 127(d).
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and other disputants that outsiders have valuable contributions to make to
the dispute settlement process.
Conclusion
The global market is expanding its rules to shape matters that have previ-
ously been domestic prerogatives. Because of the growing and changing
nature of trade policy, it should be subject to the same democratic and
accountable processes that govern other domestic policy-making. The
reforms proposed in this article would be useful first steps toward that
goal.

